Response 1 (Draft 5) Manifestation of Skepticality in Language and Literature

“The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary” (Saussure in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 62).

Saussure’s idea about how language unit is “a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms” (2004: 61) has become the pinnacle for the analysis, further approaches and studying towards language as it provides huge amount of both space and possibilities for one to uncover the arbitrariness that language carries. Even though, it is still difficult to comprehend its arbitrariness as the language system which is the seemingly most obvious apparatus to be exploited in dissecting and analyzing the arbitrariness is also arbitrary.

Yet this situation alone increases the level of intricacies that the language has; despite the irony that could be implied from the following condition, it widens the possibility for an analysis to be conducted as language is unrestrained from a bound that its own form provides. As Saussure mentioned, “the term”, as it refers to ‘arbitrary’, “should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker” (2004: 62), this proposition implies an existence of a gap within the aforementioned “choice of the signifier” as it situates an arbitrariness in a sense that it does not prohibit the option of particular presence of signifier, hence opening indeterminate possibility in choosing a distinctive signifier, or as Saussure has pointed out, “I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified” (2004: 62). The adjective “natural” which was assigned to identify the connection between the two entities of language signifies that the correlation which a signifier and a signified situates is artificial in a way that the relation exists as a result from the arbitrariness that both of elements conduct.

Nonetheless, such situation has become a symptom on the idea that the arbitrariness of language has become one of the elements in an attempt deconstructing the structure of a language as its allow such amount of flexibility for one to relate any matter under the veil of language as long as it carries some level of ‘likeness’, contextual correlation, and any degree or type of connection between respective issues; such approach is possible to be organized as within general comprehension the word ‘arbitrary’ itself refers to the idea of unspecified issue or value, creating a chance for it to be specified towards particular ideas of problems under the framework of language.

Referring, yet again, Saussure’s elaboration upon such matter, it is indeed possible for us to put this conception in correlation with something that carries similar degree of ‘contradictions’ and ‘uncertainty’—in a way, similar sense of ‘arbitrary’. That something is the whole intricacies and intrigues which skepticism—along with the concept of skeptical mind-frame, and the existence of skepticality—does situate.

Skepticality in Language

As the starting point of further elaboration regarding skepticality with all of its intricacies, if we put a discussion about the term ‘skepticism’—or the state of being ‘skeptical’, a ‘skeptic’—many people will only correlate it towards the idea of not being able to choose between several options, questioning too much about certain things, etc.; implying the idea that being skeptical is always related to the notion of how one despises so many ideas, finding flaws in each of those ideas, and so on—where most of those opinions are the negative ones—Even though, some of which are acceptable, the term skepticism or being skeptical does not always imply that that particular person is not able or not willing to recognize and appreciate the validity or even the mere existence of certain proposition; it is the other way around. 

“The Greek word skepsis means enquiry or investigation. But a sceptic is not merely who investigates...Sceptical investigation is distinctively shaped by the possibility of deception and error” (Thorsrud, 2009: 1).

Tracing back to its roots, generally speaking, the word skeptic—or sceptic in its archaic form—is a state of having enquiries about certain issues or a will to investigate something even deeper than before. This condition implies that the seemingly indecisive behavior of a skeptic is not merely caused by the reason that he/ she was not willing to agree on a particular opinion—even though the term ‘to agree’ seems too strong for me as it enclose the possibility of further argumentation—but by the existence of unresolved explanation, resulting further questioning and enquiries, thus preventing themselves to fully accept or agree on one opinion. By being in doubt of their own thoughts, does not simply imply that they’re not doing anything about it as their own enquiries are the results of their skepticality—being skeptical. Yet, the word “doubt” can be considered as one of the most relatable antecedents of the whole state of being skeptical as the word itself generally comprehended as the sense of uncertainty, thus resulting the situation of not believing something. In a way, we could say that being in doubt is the metonymy of being skeptical, as both contain a similar degree of uncertainty—both does carry the term ‘uncertainty’ as one of its significant identification. Even though, its outcome—or manifestation—in terms of how doubt correlates with the state of not believing something is problematic as it does not situate particular, and practical manifestation towards the situation of not believing something—it does not have any way for it to resolve the issue of not believing something.

“And first of all, it is to be noticed that to be a consistent sceptic, a man should be ready to commit himself to the definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628).

A.K. Rogers in his writings entitled “Scepticism” (1904) has said that the idea of being skeptical, or to be a skeptic, is to put one’s self to a state-of-mind where one will not have any sorts of reason to fully accept “any one thing as true above any other thing”, meaning that one has to accept the idea that one thing does not possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to any other. A situation which somehow implies the idea that there is no such thing as the ‘truest’ thing, creating a kind of possibility for many other things to be as valid—in terms of its acceptability when it is being used to support a preposition—in terms of its degree of ‘truth’. To put it in general explanation, we could say that this idea of being skeptical gives us a wide range of possibilities as it considers all thing to be equally valid, which is highly important if say we are going to analyze or perhaps to uncover something as it provides us an abundant amount of point of view to be used in doing such act.

In correlation to our previous comprehension upon the matter, this elaboration defies the idea that being skeptical is not simply to stop at a barricade of deciding to not believe in something but it is to put one self upon a crossroads which lead towards the possibilities to assess the validity of particular ideas, issues, etc. Rogers did mention that skepticality is “the crystallization of the attitude of a distrust of finality” (1904: 631), implying an act of doubting ‘finality’ which will lead to an attempt of searching, or assessing the validity about things that carry a kind of correlation with the former idea of ‘finality’. In a way, the ‘distrust of finality’ does not lead one to stop in terms of his investigation regarding such matter but it situates the idea of looking for more ‘evidence’ or ‘supporting arguments’, which is both directly and indirectly correlated with the degree of validity that an idea may carry, in trying to believe something yet not in a way that it fetishizes the believed concept by eventually stopping the act of investigation but rather one will always perceive the idea that the continuity of skeptical investigation will not end that easily.

Nonetheless, if such continuity of skeptical investigation ought to diminished, Rogers stated that it is situated by “simply a difference of interest” (pg. 630). “No man is a sceptic in every direction” he stated, “Few men are sceptics in the special field which they have made their own” (pg. 629). This further elaborated identification of skepticality by Rogers is indeed interesting as we ought to uncover similar degree of arbitrariness within this whole ‘system’ of skeptical approach with one that language situates. Such assumption is solely based on the situation where a manifestation of skeptical approach determined by one’s interest towards certain problems. The sense of arbitrariness is then situated by the relevance of one’s interest upon such matter as the idea of interest itself is generally arbitrary in a way that it correlates with the variety of perceptions, and of course interest, that a person may carry. Thus, relating to the seemingly ‘natural’ connection between signifier and signified, we ought to say that the continuity of skeptical approach upon certain topic is artificial, or a product of the manufacture between one’s interest and perspective towards the particular problems—as it is somehow impossible for every men to have exactly similar interest, considering the plurality of their respective perspectives.

Skepticality in Structure

                                                                                                                                        

Then, if we are now to relate the following conditions and situations of being skeptical with a language-related issue, especially the problems within the fundamental of language—the problem regarding structure of course—Jacques Derrida will have a lot of things to show, especially when it is related with his well-known idea on Deconstruction, or some may say Post-Structuralism.

“…up to the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, fixed origin” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1206).

As it has been mentioned before in Thorsrud’s explanation about the term skeptical—or skepsis, the idea of being skeptical is related to an urge or an act of investigation which is constructed by discovering the possibility of mistakes or incompatible explanation about something. In his writing “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966), Derrida has shown the elaboration of his own further enquiries and investigation towards Saussure’s concept about structure as he seems to be skeptical on how the idea and the term structure is made and used.

Even though Derrida is aware the idea of creating a center and the existence of a center within the structure, rather than accepting those following situations, he was questioning the condition of the structurality itself as he enquired about how it “has always been neutralized or reduced” by “a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence” which seems to be ironic as the idea of constructing a center, in hoping to ‘organize’ its structurality, ended up decreasing its own value as the center somehow prohibits its own structure from anything but its own, just like what Derrida has said that “the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure” (2004: 1206). It is indeed intriguing if we are talking about “the play of the structure” as the idea somehow implies that the structurality of the structure prevented itself to tamper around with its own structurality which is also limiting the idea of developing and enhancing as it somehow forbids external interference towards the construction of its structurality. In a way, this condition also implies that we could not be skeptical when we are discussing about such matter—the matter of structure—which is somehow difficult as the basic idea of being skeptical, the idea of being curious to investigate something further, is one of the nature of human being. Even though there will be some who only embrace his own curiosity without doing anything about it, as it has been elaborated about such possibility by the existence of correlation between the desire to continue one’s skeptical enquiries with one’s interests, still the concept of center in structure will become a hurdle for those who are willing to decipher or ‘tamper’—as a result of one’s curiosity—with the structurality of structure itself.

“Formalist find ambiguity and irony; deconstructors find contradiction and undecidability…post-structuralists celebrate the apparently limitless possibilities for the production of meaning that come about when the language of the critic enters the language of the text” (Miller in Murfin, 1989: 204-5)

Derrida’s idea on deconstruction has led many deconstructors to utilize his concept of deconstructing in deciphering, analyzing, or simply discussing any matter related to the language—as the concept of deconstruction begins with Derrida’s enquiries towards Saussure’s idea about structure of language, or linguistic unit. As the process of deconstruction requires one to defamiliarize and to deconstruct an idea within language, especially in form of a text or literary text, as Miller said that “both the formalist and the deconstructor focus on the literary text” (1989: 204) one ought to discover the “contradiction” and “undecidability” within the text which will become their main concern of the text.

If we are to correlate this situation and mind-frame back to the idea of skepticality, the term “contradiction” and “undecidability” seem to be in a relation with the term “deception” and “error” which Thorsrud has explained both as the elements of skeptical investigation. A deception can be considered as an idea which cause us to be led into something that is not valid—as it may possesses arguable degree of its sense of argumentation and so on—and an error carries similar attributes with a deception as it is also something that possesses an arguable value in its conduct and its own argumentation. In a way, both “deception” and “error” seem to be a part of “contradiction” as the arguable or doubtful value that both terms possess will eventually lead into a matter of contradiction as those arguable and doubtful value may contradict with another idea under the same concept or certain relevance with any other matter. To some degree, those contradictions may possess some probabilities to influence the sense of ‘undecidability’ on the respective matter or problem as it doubts one’s perception about something by the existence of both deception and error that contradicts with one previous awareness or understanding about similar matter. From this situation alone we could assume that the idea of “contradiction” and “undecidability”, which are the issues that a deconstructor tries to discover in a text, carry an essence of both the terms “deception” and “error” which are the crucial elements in the skeptical investigation. Thus, it is possible for us to assume that there is a kind of interchangeable correlation between those terms as one seems to contribute a portion of its core idea to the other.

Moving further into Miller’s elaboration, he did mention that “the post-structuralists break with formalists”, yet again, “over an issue” which “involves metaphor and metonymy”, both of which are “two terms for different kinds of rhetorical “tropes” or figures of speech” (1989, 205). What has emerged to our concern is not about the metaphor, but the enigmatic metonymy. Miller followed up his elaboration with a brief identification that “Metonymy refers to a figure that is chosen to stand for something that it is commonly associated with…” (pg. 205), yet with this explanation alone we ought to uncover a slight implication on how metonymy contains a certain degree of arbitrariness, in relation to how it is previously explained that there is an existence of skepticality within this manifestation of Derrida’s deconstruction. The possibility of such preposition refers back to the idea of how metonymy is simply a figure, chosen to stand for something, “that is commonly associated with” as the requirement of which to be assigned with something that has certain degree of association, with the term ‘commonly’, situates yet another symptom of arbitrariness as it implies a certain condition of uncertainty where it will require an arbitrary correlation between the figure and the thing that is being ‘figured’ up by metonymy; similar to the correlation, or artificial correlation that exist between skepticality and one’s interest, or between signifier and signified.

Skepticality in Criticism

“The object of criticism is very different; the object of criticism is not “the world” but a discourse, the discourse of someone else: criticism is discourse upon a discourse; it is a second language, or a meta-language (as the logicians would say), which operates on a first language (or language object)” (Barthes, 1964: 48). 

According to Barthes’ explanation in his writings “What Is Criticism?” (1964), it would be difficult for us to differ or to separate criticism with language as it has become the second language upon the basis structure of language itself. It comes in a form of discourse that discuss about another discourse. Such situation is indeed possible if we think back to the issues and intricacies that Derrida pointed out upon Saussure’s idea of structure; especially the structure of linguistic unit—which obviously correlate with the existence of discourse and all of the language related matter—as it has become the pinnacle of an act of criticism showed by Derrida through his elaboration and argumentation, written in a form of his own discourse, about the frailty of Saussure’s concept on structure of the language—as it comes in a form of discourse, Saussure’s discourse about the structure of the language. This situation also implies the idea that to be critical is to have a further discussion about a topic being argued about within a discourse, especially a discourse which was made by another people—along with its own relevance and contradictions.

“For if criticism is only a metalanguage, this means that its task is not at all to discover “truth”, but only “validities”…It is by acknowledging itself as no more than a language (or more precisely, a meta-language) that criticism can be—paradoxically but authentically—both objective and subjective, historical and existential, totalitarian and liberal” (Barthes, 1964: 48-9).

The critical act of writing a criticism comes from the idea of uncovering values of validities that the language, the text, or the discourse carry within itself. Some may say that the act of criticism is merely to find the ‘truth’ that lies beneath its object of analysis, yet it would be very difficult for one to insist in finding ‘truth’ within a language, text or a discourse as the language itself is arbitrary, meaning that there will be multiple existence of ‘truth’ within a language which depends on one’s perspective towards the language itself.

If we put this situation within the perspective of a skeptical mind, it seems to contradict the idea that all things is fairly valid and there is no such thing as the ‘truest’ idea or concept. The idea of criticism is simply to discover the validities—some of which are hidden, some are bluntly elaborated—that lay within a text, language or a discourse. This idea alone somehow correlates with the commitment to the idea that one “has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628) which is the fundamental concept of skeptical perspective as it defies the possibility for a ‘truest’ thing to exists, allowing every single thing to carry a degree of validity in its possession. In its condition of being nothing more than a language—being a meta-language—criticism carries the possibility to be objective yet subjective, both historical and existential, totalitarian and liberal which also implies the vast range that it covers, emphasizing the idea that every single thing, with each of its contradiction or even correlation with one another, is indeed valid to be considered as supportive and argumentative references in doing the act of criticism itself—or even to simply discuss something in particular.

Even though, such vastness of topic and ideas to be discussed may become confusing for several people, we ought to remember the idea that a skeptical investigation is fairly based on our founding upon deception and error which will be possible to be discovered as a result from the abundant ideas that may correlate and even contradict with one another. This is one of the example of the advantages that we could acquire by being skeptical as it will uncover our repressed enquiries, questions, doubts, and uncertainty, with which we can dig deeper into each discourses, decreasing the odds for us to be misguided by the myth, general idea, and so on about any matter related to our own interests. Yet, as a product of skepticality, there is a possibility for us to be skeptical even against the whole process and product of criticism itself. It is indeed ironic yet the continuity of skepticality is inevitable as to be curious is one of human’s characteristic—one that differs one from another is the willingness to elaborate his or her curiosity. Coming back to the idea that curiosity is one of human’s behavior, and the cycle of skepticality that will always accompany our way of thinking—as long as we are able to exploit it properly, as long as we are aware that we can use our own doubt to enrich our own knowledge—it seems to be valid that the sense of skepticality, of being skeptical is the reason, or perhaps one of the necessary element for us to keep on criticizing, to improve our range of knowledge on studies in respective matters like language, text, discourse, or even literature.

However, the perception upon the possibility for an existent continuity of skeptical investigation is both partial and dependent. Its partiality comes in a way that it is ought to be considered as one of the possibilities that may occur as a manifestation from the existence of skepticality within criticism, and this idea ignores the preceding elaboration about the arbitrariness of skepticality itself. Nonetheless, it is indeed possible to maintain such continuity of skepticality within the whole construction of criticism if one does have enough interest to willingly persist in manifesting the skeptical investigation, and referring to such condition we could also signify that the continuity of skepticality within criticism is fairly dependent. Dependent in a sense that the existence and persistence of such consistency depend highly to the cooperation of one’s interest as the result from, yet again, the arbitrariness of skepticality. This condition does situate an implication that the relation between skepticality and its own arbitrariness is problematic in a way that each aspect constitutes one another.

Skepticality in Discourses about Representation

The term ‘representation’ has become the cult for many people who indulged themselves inside the realm of literary studies where some have used the approach properly, and some have been lost while finding the appropriate way to apply such method in analyzing their respective object of study. No one is at fault in struggling to properly apply the problematic cult of representation, as it seems to be so arbitrary, providing ways for the people to analyze even a single misuse of punctuation or an error in subject and object placement of sentence within a work of literature, as long as they consider those issues as an viable references for them to write a simple essay—with distinctive reasons that each of person has in doing so. In a way, the whole idea of writing about any kind of representation/s is simply based by one’s distinctive enquiries or skepticality—degree of being in doubt or uncertain about something—leading to the process of finding intriguing, eye-catching and mind-catching issues followed up by actually discussing those problems and arranging them into a simple writing.

“And by scepticism I shall mean here that some- what unsystematic attitude whose ground is to be found primarily in an appeal to the fact of error, and a challenge to point out the marks by which we might recognize truth if we once were to stumble on it” (Rogers, 1904: 627).

Referring to the following elaboration from A.K. Rogers—in an attempt to correlate skepticality with the enigmatic understanding of representation—such condition emphasize the degree of arbitrariness implemented within the discussion on representation as according to Rogers, the emergence of issues that lead into the construction of discussion about representation, similar to the act of criticism, is based on the idea of finding “the fact of error” and to uncover “the marks by which we might recognize truth”. Even though, it is still questionable if “we might recognize truth” as the concept of ‘truth’ itself is indeed problematic, yet Rogers put an interesting sentence after those remarks, saying that “we might recognize truth if we once were to stumble on it” as it comes in a form of a conditional sentence and also with the selection of the word ‘stumble’ implying the idea of recognizing the truth is simply coincidental or even accidental.

Moreover, the type of error or contradiction which is usually being elaborated within the discourse concerning issues of representation is always related with the thing that is seemingly represented inside a work of literature, essay, or any type of discourse. It does not concern with the degree of ‘truth’ which a representation in a literature, essay or discourse signifies and carries—about particular idea, thing, or issue—but it emphasizes on the process of questioning the degree of ‘validity’ within a representation which was implied and constructed inside works of literature, essays or discourses. These condition magnifies the defying of ‘truth’ and the acceptance of possibility in the equality of validity within every single product of language—especially literature, essay, and critical discourses.

“It should not be possible to read nineteenth-century British literature without remembering that imperialism, understood as England’s social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural representation of England to the English” (Spivak in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 838).

As we take Spivak’s elaboration in her writings “Three Women’s Text and a Critique of Imperialism” to be a practical example of how enigmatically elusive representation is, what we could imply from her idea about how nineteenth-century British literature is simply a part of the cultural representation of England is an evidence showing the condition where Spivak is simply questioning how the validity and the value in the nineteenth-century British literature is merely a representation of the cultural values of England. Her writings is mainly constructed by the elaboration every single contradictions of representations which were shown within the nineteenth-century British literature, like in “Jane Eyre” (1847) where the problems regarding women’s psychological are represented through “Jane’s self-marginalized uniqueness” (2004: 840) which eventually leads to the presupposition of how “the progress of Jane Eyre can be charted through a sequential of the family/ counter-family dyad” (2004: 841). Implying that any mental related ideas that Jane did carry will leads to the binary conception of a family and counter-family, which later becomes the problem on how one type of family is being represented through the presence, existence, or even action of the characters within the story. Moreover, in Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” (1818), the main concern of the representation elaborated through its sentences is a dispute where “Frankenstein’s apparent antagonist is God himself as Maker of Man, but his real competitor is also woman as the maker of children” (2004: 847).

Using those elaborations of contradictions, Spivak was able to point out her ideas of how several elements included in particular literature correlate with the concept of imperialism, which is one of England’s social objectives, thus signifying the idea that the whole situation is only a part of the cultural representation of England. Another implication which we could slightly uncover from this situation is that by using or by elaborating the intricacies that Spivak did find from her object of analysis through the construction of representation, while manifesting means of representation, she was able to expand and express her own enquiries towards the contradiction and uncertainty of the validity regarding the correlating ideas, topics and problems—a manifestation of skeptical investigation upon such matter. Moreover, this situation also signify both a deviance and an accordance to the arbitrariness that lies within skepticality. It is a deviance in a way that this approach does defy the arbitrariness of skepticality by driving the skeptical investigation towards a specific course that is the matter of representation, or to be more exact, the matter of England’s cultural representation through the manifestation of elements correlated imperialism within particular literature. Yet it is also an accordance to the arbitrariness of skepticality as the whole application of skepticality which is manipulated and manifested through representation regarding such particular matter signifies the idea that skepticality does contain certain degree of arbitrariness that allows itself to be utilized in elaborating Spivak’s prepositions regarding imperialism and the cultural representation of England.

Skepticality in Text

“What constitutes the Text is, on the contrary (or precisely), its subversive force in respect of the old classifications...If the Text poses problems of classifications…it always involves a certain experience of limits” (Barthes, 1977: 157).

Following Barthes’ elaboration regarding the range which Text has in term of expanding and applying its system, functions, etc. through his writings “From Work to Text” in one of his renown Image, Music, Text (1977), we ought to perceive the fundamental elements with which Text constitutes itself is its own revolt towards the old classifications—which seem to refer towards the generic classifications like genre, periodical relevance, etc. Nonetheless, this identification alone situates an implication that Text carries a sense of skepticality as its attempt to subvert the pre-existent system of classifications correlates with the idea of how skeptical investigation lead to “a distrust of finality” (Rogers, 1904: 631).

Text tries to defy the old classification as the system of classification itself signifies a kind of finality in a way that it has become the only cabinet in which works, writings, discourses are categorized. Even though we ought to accept such mean of categorizing as it does simplify the problematic and enigmatic process of classification, Text recognizes such situation as “a certain experience of limits” (1977: 157). To consider such simplification—the old system of classification—as a limit may be problematic within a perspective of certain group of people, yet it is not entirely a mistake considering the plurality—about which Barthes did elaborate further in the writings—intricacies, and complexities that Text does contain in its construction, function and manifestation. It reminded us on how ironic the structurality of structure is, if we perceive such matter under a correlation with Derrida’s perspective that is. Nonetheless, this condition alone somehow signifies that the general influence for Text to distrust the finality of old classification system is its own awareness in uncovering the contradiction and deception of such system which is implemented through the limitation that Text experienced. We could say that Text’s awareness is an awareness and even a manifestation of skepticality or skeptical approach and investigation which it vividly applies towards the old classification system.

Later in his writings, while elaborating under the same idea regarding Text—of its range, thing that constitutes Text—Barthes mentioned that “the Text is always paradoxical” (pg. 158). It is indeed another identification that Barthes pointed out regarding the constitution of a Text. And it is indeed intriguing as if we refer to the term ‘paradoxical’, or ‘paradox’, the general comprehension of such term signifies a condition where Text is able situate a binary contradictions regarding its own constitution yet each of which is possible to be considered as valid. Barthes did mention similar idea in “The Death of the Author” (1977), saying that “We know now that a text is…a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (1977: 146). In other words, Text situates both sense of arbitrariness and uncertainty within its own constitutions in a way that even though it provides contradictory elements yet both of which are capable to be valid. It is a dimension where its own constitutions, that comes in a form of variety of writings, “blend and clash”; it contradicts one another yet its own validity blend with each other as well. It is indeed a correlation with the sense of arbitrary as the outcome of its constitution may vary unless one applies a particular and specific ideas towards it.

The arbitrariness of Text is magnified once again as Barthes also pointed out that “The logic regulating the text is not comprehensive but metonymic” (pg. 158). As the problematic and enigmatic features of the term metonymy, or metonymic, along with its arguable correlation with arbitrariness has been mentioned earlier in this writings, we could imply that “the logic regulating the text” is also arbitrary. Its arbitrariness is a product that is manufactured by the arbitrary value lying within the figure of metonymy, situating the idea that the logic of the text runs with a system which is commonly associated with particular matters—as it relates to the construction of metonymy.

“A text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relation of dialogue…but there is tane place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader” (Barthes, 1977: 148)

From Barthes elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), what we could imply from the “tane place” which is “the reader” is the idea that even though the text itself is indeed multi-dimensional, complex, filled with contradictions, etc. it is simply arbitrary as that one thing that is able to focus the text is the reader. It reminded us to the relation between skepticality and one’s desire to fully commit in investigating particular matter using the skeptical approach as the text is correlated to the reader; one who will eventually take part in threading its own woven fabric of multi-dimensional ideas. Yet, a further elaboration on the interest—as the main measure point of arbitrariness—or desire of the reader, regarding its position as the focus point of a text, according to Barthes, is problematic. Problematic in an arbitrary way as my understanding and comprehension towards such matter is merely shallow, for the moment.   

Skepticality in Writing and Literature

“…writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away…” (Barthes, 1977: 142)

Again referring to Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977), what has become the concern of his elaboration above is the idea of how a writing “is the destruction of” not focusing my interest towards ‘voice’, but “every point of origin”. The term ‘origin’ upon the object of writing’s destruction is intriguing in a way that it carries similar sense that of the old classification system that a text tries to subvert. It is similar in a way that both text and writing is trying to defy an idea of finality which is implemented in the old classification system and the every point of origin. The value of finality, particularly in relation to writing, is signified by the idea of origin as it does contain similar sense to old in the old classification system as both carry similar sense of periodical relevance.

With the idea of the destruction towards every point of origin that is relevant to the matter of writing, it does not only imply the idea that writing contains a certain degree of skepticality which is manifested by its distrust towards every point of origin, but the way that Barthes used the term ‘destruction’, or ‘to destruct’ can be considered as another point of signification towards the skepticality of writing as it implies the idea that writing is committing itself towards to the situation where it does not accept, or simply defies, one point of origin as one that possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to the other. It applies such approach by destructing, scattering, every point of origin thus putting itself nowhere—regarding its perspective, as it tries to not be influence by external sources other than itself—but the place of its own existence; it may sound similar to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, yet it is simply to “de” the structure of every point of origin, as it refers to the idea of simply scattering the structure of the origin.

Furthermore, the term ‘neutral’ which is used as one of its identification in Barthes’ writings conducts a problematic implication as it is indeed generally problematic to consider one idea as ‘neutral’, to consider writing as so, as the language which is clearly the fundamental elements of writing itself is arbitrary, thus defying any possibility regarding the existence of ‘neutral’ perspective. Yet, if we do perceive the word ‘neutral’ as a situation where one situates an open-mindedness in a sense that it has the will to accept various proposition, and to assess each of those presuppositions of idea as equally valid, the existence of the word is not entirely problematic but merely a manifestation of, yet again, the sense of skepticality.

However, it is enigmatic to relate such skepticality if we do observe the sentence “where our subject slips away” as it somehow defies the idea of arbitrariness that skepticality carries alongside its state of uncertainty. The arbitrariness seems to be diminished in a way that the subject, “our subject” is being detached from the writing itself. The subject is significant in relation to the concept of skepticality as it is the closest element on which we can correlate the variety of interest in conducting such skeptical approach. Yet, later in his writings, as it has been mentioned before, the vocal point of arbitrariness in writing, or text in general, is switched over upon the perception of the readers as they have the ability and the possibility, according to Barthes’ elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), to take part in the complexity of the text, signifying their importance towards the construction of the text, and somehow correlate with the arbitrariness that text contains.

Moving our attention from the so-called ‘general’ writing towards the whole intricacies, structure and construction of literature, I wish not to confront my elaboration upon the enigmatic question that says “what is literature?” followed by the opinion that “isn’t such inquiries signify a skeptical approach towards literature?” but to merely address the skepticality that is involved with the whole construction and system of literature, as it is generally discussing the skepticality ‘in’ literature, not the skeptical approach that one may have ‘against’ or ‘towards’ literature. Yet, the elaboration will not approach another problematic matter of “which one is considered as a work of literature?” as in correlation with the previous explanation—from language to writing—we ought to be aware that we are now the participant of discourse as we are both indirectly and directly taking part in discussing such matter, hence we should have recognize literature as a text of literature, not merely a work of literature, meaning that we would not get ourselves involved with the problem of marginalizing the literature based on its ‘quality’—the term itself is already problematic—periods, authors, genres, and so on. These following propositions are merely a kind of guideline for the elaboration which will follow.

“…writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systemic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity” (Barthes, 1977: 147).

Through the following elaboration, it is exploited that a writing continuously and vigorously puts meaning in an attempt to finally eliminate the existence of the meaning itself; creating a system that is freed from the duty of providing and elaborating meaning(s). As the boundaries between writing and literature is somehow diminished, by the existence of such explanation within the brackets, literature is also conducting the exact process of “ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it” thus implying the idea that “by refusing to assign a ‘secret’” or “an ultimate meaning”, literature “liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity”. Even without any further and specified elaboration, we could uncover the correlation of such activity that acts against the existence of an ultimate meaning with the idea of skepticality, the one that situates one to perceive every single thing as validly equal, or in other yet similar sense, it situates a distrust towards the finality which is represented by the idea of an ultimate meaning. It is an act “to refuse to fix meaning” (pg. 147).

We ought to consider such condition as the fundamental correlation and manifestation of literature and skepticality and it is undeniable that further investigation and enquiries is solely required to defy its partiality and incompleteness. Even though one may argue that the background of my elaboration is overly-elaborated, in every single sense of irony that it may present, it is lacking in a way that it does not vividly guide my perception towards the applicable code and approach with which I will be able to uncover something within any relatable literature that exists. That is the thing which has been the source of my paradigm and enigma in elaborating my perception upon such matter.

Yet, even with the premature assumption towards such ideas as something that is both paradigmatic and enigmatic, I do have a similarly premature assumption—that comes in a complex yet uncertain sketch of my own mind-frame—upon the code or approach that is the product of skepticality—which has become the base of my elaboration/s—which I could later apply on relatable literature. One of which, the premature assumption, is metonymy. What conducts the paradigm concerning such matter is the lack of comprehension as the one which I possess is merely partial, or even smaller than a partial, as it merely situate the equally enigmatic situation of its being used as “a figure that is chosen to stand for something that it is commonly associated with…” (Miller, 1989: 205). It is enigmatic in a way that the identification of it being “commonly associated” situates further enquiries, as the identification seems to be too general in a way. Nonetheless, I have less doubt concerning its possibility of further application as there are so many instances of metonymy being closely related to any kind of discourse—especially the one that utilize figure of speech as often.

The other premature assumption is the idea of mimicry, Bhabha’s elaboration on “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” (1984) to be exact. What has become my early preposition regarding the correlation between mimicry, skepticality and literature is the ambivalence which mimicry provides in actuating its whole construction. The ambivalence within mimicry somehow situates a binary situation, or perhaps, a binary contradiction, or a binary opposition as the ambivalence itself implies an ironic relation between its elements. This situation of ambivalence and binary contradictions is somehow relatable with the uncertainty or the deviance towards finality that skepticality carries. Yet, the relation of the following concepts itself is too vague in a way that is based simply by my own problematic assumption regarding such matter. And, to my comprehension, referring to Bhabha’s analogical, or metaphorical, references towards the problem of colonialism and perhaps post-colonialism implies an idea that such matter regarding mimicry will only and always be related to the colonial-related problem. As it has been mentioned before about the arbitrariness of language and skepticality, this situation seems to be a viable example of one who’s struggling to continue on the investigation upon something which he does not have that much of an interest at.

On the contrary, concerning such arbitrary interest upon something, the idea of how one’s conscious and unconscious that is introduced by Freud, and followed by further elaboration and perhaps exploitation by Lacan, has interfere in a way that it situates the will to look for any correlation between the realm of psychoanalysis and the concept of skepticality, and it also incompletely produce an idea that it has something to do with one’s ideology, or ideological references. Yet, again, my comprehension upon such idea is merely shallow in a way that it is implemented in the inability to find the slightest correlation that it may have with skepticality or even language and literature. Even though some may vigorously state that the relation between psychoanalytical elements with language and literature is bluntly obvious, the degree of comprehension which I achieve is not enough in eventually discovering such correlation.

Nonetheless, it is merely an attempt, a premature attempt of intertwining the intricacies regarding skepticality which have persisted and manifested since one finally aware of the intellectuality of his brain and mind until the problematic influence which leads me to this position with the matter of my other interest that is language, and also, all of its manipulation or even exploitation. It is an attempt with which I wish to be able to uncover, or merely recover something. It is an attempt which carries the possibility to become a starting point. A starting point of my further confusion, future premature assumption upon matters that drive my own arbitrariness towards something that is subjectively specific.  

Work Cited:

Barthes, Roland.1964. “What is Criticism?” retrieved from http://eng5010.pbworks.com/f/Barthes.pdf

1977. “From Work to Text” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 155-164). Great Britain: Fontana Press

1977. “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 142-148). Great Britain: Fontana Press

Bhabha, Homi. 1984. “Of Mimicry and Men: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” in October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring, 1984; pp.125-133). The MIT Press retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/778467

Derrida, Jacques. 1966. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Critical Theory Since Plato ed. Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3^rd edition; pg. 1206-1215). United States: Wadsworth Publishing.

Miller, J. Hillis.1989. “A Deconstructive Critic at Work” in Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness: A Case Study in Contemporary Criticism ed. Murfin, Ross C. (1989). New York: St. Martin’s Press    

Rogers, A. K. 1904. “Scepticism” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13 No. 6. North Carolina, United States: Duke University Press.

Saussure, Ferdinand De. 1916. “Course in General Linguistic” in Literary Theory: An Anthology ed. Rivkin, Julie and Ryan, Michael (2004, 2nd edition; pg. 59-71). United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1986. “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” in Literary Theory: An Anthology ed. Rivkin, Julie and Ryan, Michael (2004, 2nd edition; pg. 838-853). United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.

Thorsrud, Harald. 2009. Ancient Scepticism. Stocksflied, England: Acumen.