Response 1 (Draft 7) Matters of Materiality: Skeptical Irony

Marx’s preposition on how “by producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life” (in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 653) which he did elaborate through his writings entitled “The German Ideology” (1846) can be perceived as one of the fundamental argumentation and explanation upon the importance of physical and/ or material matters alongside its significant correlation with humanity, of being men, of being human. It is fundamental in a sense that his emphasize towards the process of producing, ‘to produce’, already and obviously signifies both involvement of and association with ‘physical’ value, as the existence of a subject and an object will be required in such process, process of production, and also ‘material’ attribute, as every single elements of such process is indeed concrete—concrete subject, concrete process, concrete object. Nonetheless, later as the result of its further manifestation, development, etc. the preceding conception upon the ‘physical’ and ‘material’ existence ought to be considered as the basic point of view and perception that situates the so-called economic cultural theory or simply economic approach—and some may call Marxism, Marxist Criticism, or even Economic Determinism, etc. If I’m not mistaken. 

Its economic sense, economic value, economic matters, ought to be discussed in accordance to Marx’s further elaboration as he associated such point of view with labor, alongside its intricacies and intrigues, which later be correlated with the division of classes, or the social structure in general, as he did mention that “how far the productive forces of a nation are developed is shown most manifestly by the degree to which division of labor has been carried” (in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 653). The significance of productive forces is indeed obvious as it is a part of the whole structure of ‘producing’, and what has become more vivid is that its own development is in correlation with distinctive division of labor which later associates with the intricacies of social structure and classes.  

Though it was no explicitly explained, the intricacies that stood up to be the main concern of this writing is the defiance towards the idea of spiritual origin, the one-sided signification towards ‘mental’ process, actuated through the seemingly revolutionary approach upon materiality. Yet, it is not the generic act of defiance which such theoretical investigation signifies. It is an act of defiance, an act of distrust, disloyalty towards the preceding conception of spirituality. Such act is already able to be perceived as arguable symptom. A symptom upon the idea of skepticality. 

Skepticality

As the starting point of further elaboration regarding skepticality with all of its intricacies—and later its ‘correlation’ with materiality—if we put a discussion about the term ‘skepticism’—or the state of being ‘skeptical’, a ‘skeptic’—many people will only correlate it towards the idea of not being able to choose between several options, questioning too much about certain things, etc.; implying the idea that being skeptical is always related to the notion of how one despises so many ideas, finding flaws in each of those ideas, and so on—where most of those opinions are the negative ones—Even though, some of which are acceptable, the term skepticism or being skeptical does not always imply that that particular person is not able or not willing to recognize and appreciate the validity or even the mere existence of certain proposition; it is the other way around. 

“The Greek word skepsis means enquiry or investigation. But a sceptic is not merely who investigates...Sceptical investigation is distinctively shaped by the possibility of deception and error” (Thorsrud, 2009: 1).

Tracing back to its roots, generally speaking, the word skeptic—or sceptic in its archaic form—is a state of having enquiries about certain issues or a will to investigate something even deeper than before. This condition implies that the seemingly indecisive behavior of a skeptic is not merely caused by the reason that he/ she was not willing to agree on a particular opinion—even though the term ‘to agree’ seems too strong for me as it enclose the possibility of further argumentation—but by the existence of unresolved explanation, resulting further questioning and enquiries, thus preventing themselves to fully accept or agree on one opinion. By being in doubt of their own thoughts, does not simply imply that they’re not doing anything about it as their own enquiries are the results of their skepticality—being skeptical. Yet, the word “doubt” can be considered as one of the most relatable antecedents of the whole state of being skeptical as the word itself generally comprehended as the sense of uncertainty, thus resulting the situation of not believing something. In a way, we could say that being in doubt is the metonymy of being skeptical, as both contain a similar degree of uncertainty—both does carry the term ‘uncertainty’ as one of its significant identification. Even though, its outcome—or manifestation—in terms of how doubt correlates with the state of not believing something is problematic as it does not situate particular, and practical manifestation towards the situation of not believing something—it does not have any way for it to resolve the issue of not believing something.

“And first of all, it is to be noticed that to be a consistent sceptic, a man should be ready to commit himself to the definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628).

A.K. Rogers in his writings entitled “Scepticism” (1904) has said that the idea of being skeptical, or to be a skeptic, is to put one’s self to a state-of-mind where one will not have any sorts of reason to fully accept “any one thing as true above any other thing”, meaning that one has to accept the idea that one thing does not possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to any other. A situation which somehow implies the idea that there is no such thing as the ‘truest’ thing, creating a kind of possibility for many other things to be as valid—in terms of its acceptability when it is being used to support a preposition—in terms of its degree of ‘truth’. To put it in general explanation, we could say that this idea of being skeptical gives us a wide range of possibilities as it considers all thing to be equally valid, which is highly important if say we are going to analyze or perhaps to uncover something as it provides us an abundant amount of point of view to be used in doing such act.

In correlation to our previous comprehension upon the matter, this elaboration defies the idea that being skeptical is not simply to stop at a barricade of deciding to not believe in something but it is to put one self upon a crossroads which lead towards the possibilities to assess the validity of particular ideas, issues, etc. Rogers did mention that skepticality is “the crystallization of the attitude of a distrust of finality” (1904: 631), implying an act of doubting ‘finality’ which will lead to an attempt of searching, or assessing the validity about things that carry a kind of correlation with the former idea of ‘finality’. In a way, the ‘distrust of finality’ does not lead one to stop in terms of his investigation regarding such matter but it situates the idea of looking for more ‘evidence’ or ‘supporting arguments’, which is both directly and indirectly correlated with the degree of validity that an idea may carry, in trying to believe something yet not in a way that it fetishizes the believed concept by eventually stopping the act of investigation but rather one will always perceive the idea that the continuity of skeptical investigation will not end that easily.

Nonetheless, if such continuity of skeptical investigation ought to diminished, Rogers stated that it is situated by “simply a difference of interest” (pg. 630). “No man is a sceptic in every direction” he stated, “Few men are sceptics in the special field which they have made their own” (pg. 629). This further elaborated identification of skepticality by Rogers is indeed interesting as we ought to uncover similar degree of arbitrariness within this whole ‘system’ of skeptical approach with one that language situates. Such assumption is solely based on the situation where a manifestation of skeptical approach determined by one’s interest towards certain problems. The sense of arbitrariness is then situated by the relevance of one’s interest upon such matter as the idea of interest itself is generally arbitrary in a way that it correlates with the variety of perceptions, and of course interest, that a person may carry. Thus, we ought to say that the continuity of skeptical approach upon certain topic is artificial, or a product of the manufacture between one’s interest and perspective towards the particular problems—as it is somehow impossible for every men to have exactly similar interest, considering the plurality of their respective perspectives.

Skepticality of Language

“The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary” (Saussure in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 62).

Saussure’s idea about how language unit is “a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms” (2004: 61) has become the pinnacle for the analysis, further approaches and studying towards language as it provides huge amount of both space and possibilities for one to uncover the arbitrariness that language carries. Even though, it is still difficult to comprehend its arbitrariness as the language system which is the seemingly most obvious apparatus to be exploited in dissecting and analyzing the arbitrariness is also arbitrary.

Yet this situation alone increases the level of intricacies that the language has; despite the irony that could be implied from the following condition, it widens the possibility for an analysis to be conducted as language is unrestrained from a bound that its own form provides. As Saussure mentioned, “the term”, as it refers to ‘arbitrary’, “should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker” (2004: 62), this proposition implies an existence of a gap within the aforementioned “choice of the signifier” as it situates an arbitrariness in a sense that it does not prohibit the option of particular presence of signifier, hence opening indeterminate possibility in choosing a distinctive signifier, or as Saussure has pointed out, “I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified” (2004: 62). The adjective “natural” which was assigned to identify the connection between the two entities of language signifies that the correlation which a signifier and a signified situates is artificial in a way that the relation exists as a result from the arbitrariness that both of elements conduct.

Nonetheless, such situation has become a symptom on the idea that the arbitrariness of language has become one of the elements in an attempt deconstructing the structure of a language as its allow such amount of flexibility for one to relate any matter under the veil of language as long as it carries some level of ‘likeness’, contextual correlation, and any degree or type of connection between respective issues; such approach is possible to be organized as within general comprehension the word ‘arbitrary’ itself refers to the idea of unspecified issue or value, creating a chance for it to be specified towards particular ideas of problems under the framework of language.

Such condition of arbitrariness, not only creating the room for the aforementioned flexibility, situates similar circumstances upon its association with the idea of skepticality. The arbitrary language ought to establish the idea that its own structure are situated within the concept of not putting itself above the other, as its arbitrariness indicates the situation of unspecified value, in a sense that it put its own system and structure within the vicinity of Rogers’ “definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (1904: 628). The artificial correlation between signifier and signified is also, in a way, a manifestation of such framework of perception as we could consider the outcome of such process, producing artificiality, as a result from the skepticality, in a sense that its manifestation of arbitrariness which lies within the whole process of creating the artificial correlation is one of the signification upon the idea of not specifying itself towards certain distinctive matter but leading to the state of unspecified value that is the sense of arbitrary.  

Skepticality of Structure

“…up to the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, fixed origin” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1206).

As it has been mentioned before in Thorsrud’s explanation about the term skeptical—or skepsis, the idea of being skeptical is related to an urge or an act of investigation which is constructed by discovering the possibility of mistakes or incompatible explanation about something. In his writing “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966), Derrida has shown the elaboration of his own further enquiries and investigation towards Saussure’s concept about structure as he seems to be skeptical on how the idea and the term structure is made and used.

Even though Derrida is aware the idea of creating a center and the existence of a center within the structure, rather than accepting those following situations, he was questioning the condition of the structurality itself as he enquired about how it “has always been neutralized or reduced” by “a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence” which seems to be ironic as the idea of constructing a center, in hoping to ‘organize’ its structurality, ended up decreasing its own value as the center somehow prohibits its own structure from anything but its own, just like what Derrida has said that “the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure” (2004: 1206). It is indeed intriguing if we are talking about “the play of the structure” as the idea somehow implies that the structurality of the structure prevented itself to tamper around with its own structurality which is also limiting the idea of developing and enhancing as it somehow forbids external interference towards the construction of its structurality. In a way, this condition also implies that we could not be skeptical when we are discussing about such matter—the matter of structure—which is somehow difficult as the basic idea of being skeptical, the idea of being curious to investigate something further, is one of the nature of human being. Even though there will be some who only embrace his own curiosity without doing anything about it, as it has been elaborated about such possibility by the existence of correlation between the desire to continue one’s skeptical enquiries with one’s interests, still the concept of center in structure will become a hurdle for those who are willing to decipher or ‘tamper’—as a result of one’s curiosity—with the structurality of structure itself.

“Formalist find ambiguity and irony; deconstructors find contradiction and undecidability…post-structuralists celebrate the apparently limitless possibilities for the production of meaning that come about when the language of the critic enters the language of the text” (Miller in Murfin, 1989: 204-5)

Derrida’s idea on deconstruction has led many deconstructors to utilize his concept of deconstructing in deciphering, analyzing, or simply discussing any matter related to the language—as the concept of deconstruction begins with Derrida’s enquiries towards Saussure’s idea about structure of language, or linguistic unit. As the process of deconstruction requires one to defamiliarize and to deconstruct an idea within language, especially in form of a text or literary text, as Miller said that “both the formalist and the deconstructor focus on the literary text” (1989: 204) one ought to discover the “contradiction” and “undecidability” within the text which will become their main concern of the text.

If we are to correlate this situation and mind-frame back to the idea of skepticality, the term “contradiction” and “undecidability” seem to be in a relation with the term “deception” and “error” which Thorsrud has explained both as the elements of skeptical investigation. A deception can be considered as an idea which cause us to be led into something that is not valid—as it may possesses arguable degree of its sense of argumentation and so on—and an error carries similar attributes with a deception as it is also something that possesses an arguable value in its conduct and its own argumentation. In a way, both “deception” and “error” seem to be a part of “contradiction” as the arguable or doubtful value that both terms possess will eventually lead into a matter of contradiction as those arguable and doubtful value may contradict with another idea under the same concept or certain relevance with any other matter. To some degree, those contradictions may possess some probabilities to influence the sense of ‘undecidability’ on the respective matter or problem as it doubts one’s perception about something by the existence of both deception and error that contradicts with one previous awareness or understanding about similar matter. From this situation alone we could assume that the idea of “contradiction” and “undecidability”, which are the issues that a deconstructor tries to discover in a text, carry an essence of both the terms “deception” and “error” which are the crucial elements in the skeptical investigation. Thus, it is possible for us to assume that there is a kind of interchangeable correlation between those terms as one seems to contribute a portion of its core idea to the other.

Moving further into Miller’s elaboration, he did mention that “the post-structuralists break with formalists”, yet again, “over an issue” which “involves metaphor and metonymy”, both of which are “two terms for different kinds of rhetorical “tropes” or figures of speech” (1989, 205). What has emerged to our concern is not about the metaphor, but the enigmatic metonymy. Miller followed up his elaboration with a brief identification that “Metonymy refers to a figure that is chosen to stand for something that it is commonly associated with…” (pg. 205), yet with this explanation alone we ought to uncover a slight implication on how metonymy contains a certain degree of arbitrariness, in relation to how it is previously explained that there is an existence of skepticality within this manifestation of Derrida’s deconstruction. The possibility of such preposition refers back to the idea of how metonymy is simply a figure, chosen to stand for something, “that is commonly associated with” as the requirement of which to be assigned with something that has certain degree of association, with the term ‘commonly’, situates yet another symptom of arbitrariness as it implies a certain condition of uncertainty where it will require an arbitrary correlation between the figure and the thing that is being ‘figured’ up by metonymy; similar to the correlation, or artificial correlation that exist between skepticality and one’s interest, or between signifier and signified.

Skepticality of Text

“What constitutes the Text is, on the contrary (or precisely), its subversive force in respect of the old classifications...If the Text poses problems of classifications…it always involves a certain experience of limits” (Barthes, 1977: 157).

Following Barthes’ elaboration regarding the range which Text has in term of expanding and applying its system, functions, etc. through his writings “From Work to Text” in one of his renown Image, Music, Text (1977), we ought to perceive the fundamental elements with which Text constitutes itself is its own revolt towards the old classifications—which seem to refer towards the generic classifications like genre, periodical relevance, etc. Nonetheless, this identification alone situates an implication that Text carries a sense of skepticality as its attempt to subvert the pre-existent system of classifications correlates with the idea of how skeptical investigation lead to “a distrust of finality” (Rogers, 1904: 631).

Text tries to defy the old classification as the system of classification itself signifies a kind of finality in a way that it has become the only cabinet in which works, writings, discourses are categorized. Even though we ought to accept such mean of categorizing as it does simplify the problematic and enigmatic process of classification, Text recognizes such situation as “a certain experience of limits” (1977: 157). To consider such simplification—the old system of classification—as a limit may be problematic within a perspective of certain group of people, yet it is not entirely a mistake considering the plurality—about which Barthes did elaborate further in the writings—intricacies, and complexities that Text does contain in its construction, function and manifestation. It reminded us on how ironic the structurality of structure is, if we perceive such matter under a correlation with Derrida’s perspective that is. Nonetheless, this condition alone somehow signifies that the general influence for Text to distrust the finality of old classification system is its own awareness in uncovering the contradiction and deception of such system which is implemented through the limitation that Text experienced. We could say that Text’s awareness is an awareness and even a manifestation of skepticality or skeptical approach and investigation which it vividly applies towards the old classification system.

Later in his writings, while elaborating under the same idea regarding Text—of its range, thing that constitutes Text—Barthes mentioned that “the Text is always paradoxical” (pg. 158). It is indeed another identification that Barthes pointed out regarding the constitution of a Text. And it is indeed intriguing as if we refer to the term ‘paradoxical’, or ‘paradox’, the general comprehension of such term signifies a condition where Text is able situate a binary contradictions regarding its own constitution yet each of which is possible to be considered as valid. Barthes did mention similar idea in “The Death of the Author” (1977), saying that “We know now that a text is…a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (1977: 146). In other words, Text situates both sense of arbitrariness and uncertainty within its own constitutions in a way that even though it provides contradictory elements yet both of which are capable to be valid. It is a dimension where its own constitutions, that comes in a form of variety of writings, “blend and clash”; it contradicts one another yet its own validity blend with each other as well. It is indeed a correlation with the sense of arbitrary as the outcome of its constitution may vary unless one applies a particular and specific ideas towards it.

The arbitrariness of Text is magnified once again as Barthes also pointed out that “The logic regulating the text is not comprehensive but metonymic” (pg. 158). As the problematic and enigmatic features of the term metonymy, or metonymic, along with its arguable correlation with arbitrariness has been mentioned earlier in this writings, we could imply that “the logic regulating the text” is also arbitrary. Its arbitrariness is a product that is manufactured by the arbitrary value lying within the figure of metonymy, situating the idea that the logic of the text runs with a system which is commonly associated with particular matters—as it relates to the construction of metonymy.

“A text is made of multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relation of dialogue…but there is tane place where this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader” (Barthes, 1977: 148)

From Barthes elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), what we could imply from the “tane place” which is “the reader” is the idea that even though the text itself is indeed multi-dimensional, complex, filled with contradictions, etc. it is simply arbitrary as that one thing that is able to focus the text is the reader. It reminded us to the relation between skepticality and one’s desire to fully commit in investigating particular matter using the skeptical approach as the text is correlated to the reader; one who will eventually take part in threading its own woven fabric of multi-dimensional ideas.

Skepticality of Writing and Literature

“…writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away…” (Barthes, 1977: 142)

Again referring to Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977), what has become the concern of his elaboration above is the idea of how a writing “is the destruction of” not focusing my interest towards ‘voice’, but “every point of origin”. The term ‘origin’ upon the object of writing’s destruction is intriguing in a way that it carries similar sense that of the old classification system that a text tries to subvert. It is similar in a way that both text and writing is trying to defy an idea of finality which is implemented in the old classification system and the every point of origin. The value of finality, particularly in relation to writing, is signified by the idea of origin as it does contain similar sense to old in the old classification system as both carry similar sense of periodical relevance.

With the idea of the destruction towards every point of origin that is relevant to the matter of writing, it does not only imply the idea that writing contains a certain degree of skepticality which is manifested by its distrust towards every point of origin, but the way that Barthes used the term ‘destruction’, or ‘to destruct’ can be considered as another point of signification towards the skepticality of writing as it implies the idea that writing is committing itself towards to the situation where it does not accept, or simply defies, one point of origin as one that possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to the other. It applies such approach by destructing, scattering, every point of origin thus putting itself nowhere—regarding its perspective, as it tries to not be influence by external sources other than itself—but the place of its own existence; it may sound similar to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, yet it is simply to “de” the structure of every point of origin, as it refers to the idea of simply scattering the structure of the origin.

Furthermore, the term ‘neutral’ which is used as one of its identification in Barthes’ writings conducts a problematic implication as it is indeed generally problematic to consider one idea as ‘neutral’, to consider writing as so, as the language which is clearly the fundamental elements of writing itself is arbitrary, thus defying any possibility regarding the existence of ‘neutral’ perspective. Yet, if we do perceive the word ‘neutral’ as a situation where one situates an open-mindedness in a sense that it has the will to accept various proposition, and to assess each of those presuppositions of idea as equally valid, the existence of the word is not entirely problematic but merely a manifestation of, yet again, the sense of skepticality.

However, it is enigmatic to relate such skepticality if we do observe the sentence “where our subject slips away” as it somehow defies the idea of arbitrariness that skepticality carries alongside its state of uncertainty. The arbitrariness seems to be diminished in a way that the subject, “our subject” is being detached from the writing itself. The subject is significant in relation to the concept of skepticality as it is the closest element on which we can correlate the variety of interest in conducting such skeptical approach. Yet, later in his writings, as it has been mentioned before, the vocal point of arbitrariness in writing, or text in general, is switched over upon the perception of the readers as they have the ability and the possibility, according to Barthes’ elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), to take part in the complexity of the text, signifying their importance towards the construction of the text, and somehow correlate with the arbitrariness that text contains.

Moving our attention from the so-called ‘general’ writing towards the whole intricacies, structure and construction of literature, I wish not to confront my elaboration upon the enigmatic question that says “what is literature?” followed by the opinion that “isn’t such inquiries signify a skeptical approach towards literature?” but to merely address the skepticality that is involved with the whole construction and system of literature, as it is generally discussing the skepticality ‘in’ literature, not the skeptical approach that one may have ‘against’ or ‘towards’ literature. Yet, the elaboration will not approach another problematic matter of “which one is considered as a work of literature?” as in correlation with the previous explanation—from language to writing—we ought to be aware that we are now the participant of discourse as we are both indirectly and directly taking part in discussing such matter, hence we should have recognize literature as a text of literature, not merely a work of literature, meaning that we would not get ourselves involved with the problem of marginalizing the literature based on its ‘quality’—the term itself is already problematic—periods, authors, genres, and so on. These following propositions are merely a kind of guideline for the elaboration which will follow.

“…writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systemic exemption of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity” (Barthes, 1977: 147).

Through the following elaboration, it is exploited that a writing continuously and vigorously puts meaning in an attempt to finally eliminate the existence of the meaning itself; creating a system that is freed from the duty of providing and elaborating meaning(s). As the boundaries between writing and literature is somehow diminished, by the existence of such explanation within the brackets, literature is also conducting the exact process of “ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it” thus implying the idea that “by refusing to assign a ‘secret’” or “an ultimate meaning”, literature “liberates what may be called an anti-theological activity”. Even without any further and specified elaboration, we could uncover the correlation of such activity that acts against the existence of an ultimate meaning with the idea of skepticality, the one that situates one to perceive every single thing as validly equal, or in other yet similar sense, it situates a distrust towards the finality which is represented by the idea of an ultimate meaning. It is an act “to refuse to fix meaning” (pg. 147).

Problematic Skepticality within Materiality (Marxist approach)

The preceding elaboration is considered as examples, or point of references, regarding the idea of skepticality and all of its correlation, relation, association, or even contradiction which will also become a variety of point of views in perceiving the intricacies that I ought to discover upon the matter, the discussion about materiality, or Marxist framework concerning culture and society.

“The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly interwoven with the material activities and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people” (Marx in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 656).  

If we refer back to the foreground of his own elaboration that significantly signifies the involvement of material process and ‘materiality’ within the cycle or system of humanity with all of its accomplishes like social culture, social system, and so on. However, at first, in our general viewing, especially for one who does acknowledge the importance of this certain matter, this condition alone implies the idea that there is also the existence of mental process which contain similar degree of influence towards the matter of humanity, as it is closely related with one’s consciousness and even unconsciousness that conduct certain implication as significant as material matters towards the behavior, action, etc. of men in life; material and mental, the enigmatic correlation and manifestation of the physical and metaphysical. Nonetheless, if we look at Marx’s explanation, he argued that the ‘materiality’ or material process ought to be the dominant influence whatsoever, as the aforementioned mental process is considered as the direct efflux, the direct excess of the material process itself.

Looking towards Rogers’ explanation on how skepticality is “the crystallization of the attitude of a distrust of finality” (1904: 631), we could perceive similar circumstances occur within the correlation between mental and material process as the presentation of mental ‘intercourse’ of men as the “direct efflux” of the material matters appears to be a manifestation of distrust in a way that the mental is not considered as an independent factor but merely a part of the whole system of ‘materiality’. It is a distrust in a way that the sense of independency which was acquired by the mental process is now diminished in a way that it has been merged with the construction of ‘materiality’. In other word, we could also say that the following condition is an act of distrust towards the finality of mental-related process and matter. The term finality in this sense is established as the dominant and influential source regarding the matter of humanity with all of its antecedents; culture, social system, etc. This idea of including mental process as one of the excess from material matter ought to be perceived as a manifestation of skepticality that is a distrust towards the finality of ‘mentality’.     

“That is to say, the irreducibly individual projects that particular works are, may come in experience and in analysis to show resemblance which allow us to group them into collective modes. There are by no means always genres” (Williams, : 465).

Still with the significance upon the idea of materiality as its foreground, under Williams’ perception, in his writings “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory”, later in its development and manifestation, the dominance of materiality situates similar influence towards the matter of work, especially in literature or art. Its implication comes in a form of acknowledgement towards the work as one of the product of one’s material process, actual process of writing or presenting one’s idea through the existence of work, another situation of deviance towards previous belief, saying that the matter concerning art and literature is simply transcendental. As the work is now considered to ‘physically’ exist and to be significant, it is indeed possible to conduct “analysis to show resemblance” in trying to “group them into collective modes” (Williams, : 465). Even though, this seems to be rather un-skeptical, in a sense that it atones to the idea of ‘collective modes’, a means of classification, yet, later on his elaboration, Williams pointed out that it later uses “the principles of the relations of practices” (Williams, : 465), signifying the possibility of external references, or cross-references, between physical practices that do situate a kind of correlation with one another. In other perspective, this situation also implies a slightest sense of skepticality, as according to Rogers the state of being skeptical is relating to the idea of “the definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628), thus the availability to do cross-reference in establishing certain modes regarding resemblances of work ought to be the manifestation of the state of not accepting any ‘reference’ as true above any other ‘references’.

“…the Marxist sees them as constantly formed by their social contexts in ways which they themselves would usually not admit” (Barry, 1995: 158).    

The range of references which is used within such approach, or circumstances, according to Peter Barry’s elaboration on his book Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory (1995), expands towards the social contexts of the respective authors or individual who produce the work itself. In other sense, the vicinity of references concerning the idea of materiality and its influence on arts and literature does not focus on the work itself but, abruptly, put the social context, the social environment, with all of its intricacies, contradictions, etc. into account, signifying its attempt to not put one ‘reference’ as its core but to consider other similar, significant and relatable ‘references’ in analyzing or discussing such matter.

Nonetheless, all of the seemingly revolutionary approach that is the approach of materiality turns into a kind of ironic circumstances, in terms of its degree of skepticality as it will eventually lead into one-sided dominance of material significance. Even though, it does provide the opening of cross-reference upon ‘external’ sources like social context, economical tendency, etc., but that condition itself seems to contradict one of the foreground of skepticality that is the distrusts towards finality. It is indeed viable to consider the beginning or emergence of such materialistic approach as a manifestation of skepticality as it ‘revolutionize’ the common beliefs to consider things on its material existence yet it ended up to be a shift; a shift from mental significance towards material significance without altering its position as the ‘finality’ of the matter. We ought to say such approach merely as a shift of finality, on its outcome, rather than a distrust upon finality.

Work Cited:

Barry, Peter. 1995. Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory. Manchester, UK and New York, United States: Manchester University Press.

Barthes, Roland. 1977. “From Work to Text” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 155-164). Great Britain: Fontana Press

1977. “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 142-148). Great Britain: Fontana Press

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