As
the starting point of further elaboration regarding skepticalitywith all of its intricacies—and later its ‘correlation’
with feminine textual body—if we put a discussion about the term
‘skepticism’—or the state of being ‘skeptical’, a ‘skeptic’—many people will
only correlate it towards the idea of not being able to choose between several
options, questioning too much about certain things, etc.; implying the idea
that being skeptical is always related to the notion of how one despises so
many ideas, finding flaws in each of those ideas, and so on—where most of those
opinions are the negative ones—Even though, some of which are acceptable, the
term skepticism or being skeptical does not always imply that that particular
person is not able or not willing to recognize and appreciate the validity or
even the mere existence of certain proposition; it is the other way
around.
“The Greek word skepsis means enquiry or investigation.
But a sceptic is not merely who investigates...Sceptical investigation is
distinctively shaped by the possibility of deception and error” (Thorsrud,
2009: 1).
Tracing back to its
roots, generally speaking, the word skeptic—or sceptic in its archaic form—is a
state of having enquiries about certain issues or a will to investigate
something even deeper than before. This condition implies that the seemingly
indecisive behavior of a skeptic is not merely caused by the reason that he/
she was not willing to agree on a particular opinion—even though the term ‘to
agree’ seems too strong for me as it enclose the possibility of further
argumentation—but by the existence of unresolved explanation, resulting further
questioning and enquiries, thus preventing themselves to fully accept or agree
on one opinion. By being in doubt of their own thoughts, does not simply imply
that they’re not doing anything about it as their own enquiries are the results
of their skepticality—being skeptical.
Yet, the word “doubt” can be considered as one of the most relatable
antecedents of the whole state of being skeptical as the word itself generally
comprehended as the sense of uncertainty, thus resulting the situation of not
believing something. In a way, we could say that being in doubt is the metonymy
of being skeptical, as both contain a similar degree of uncertainty—both does
carry the term ‘uncertainty’ as one of its significant identification. Even
though, its outcome—or manifestation—in terms of how doubt correlates with the
state of not believing something is problematic as it does not situate
particular, and practical manifestation towards the situation of not believing
something—it does not have any way for it to resolve the issue of not believing
something.
“And first of
all, it is to be noticed that to be a consistent sceptic, a man should be ready
to commit himself to the definite position that he has no reason to accept any
one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628).
A.K. Rogers in his
writings entitled “Scepticism” (1904) has said that the idea of being
skeptical, or to be a skeptic, is to put one’s self to a state-of-mind where
one will not have any sorts of reason to fully accept “any one thing as true
above any other thing”, meaning that one has to accept the idea that one thing
does not possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to any other. A situation
which somehow implies the idea that there is no such thing as the ‘truest’
thing, creating a kind of possibility for many other things to be as valid—in
terms of its acceptability when it is being used to support a preposition—in
terms of its degree of ‘truth’. To put it in general explanation, we could say
that this idea of being skeptical gives us a wide range of possibilities as it
considers all thing to be equally valid, which is highly important if say we
are going to analyze or perhaps to uncover something as it provides us an
abundant amount of point of view to be used in doing such act.
In
correlation to our previous comprehension upon the matter, this elaboration
defies the idea that being skeptical is not simply to stop at a barricade of
deciding to not believe in something but it is to put one self upon a
crossroads which lead towards the possibilities to assess the validity of
particular ideas, issues, etc. Rogers did mention that skepticality is “the
crystallization of the attitude of a distrust of finality” (1904: 631),
implying an act of doubting ‘finality’ which will lead to an attempt of
searching, or assessing the validity about things that carry a kind of
correlation with the former idea of ‘finality’. In a way, the ‘distrust of
finality’ does not lead one to stop in terms of his investigation regarding
such matter but it situates the idea of looking for more ‘evidence’ or
‘supporting arguments’, which is both directly and indirectly correlated with
the degree of validity that an idea may carry, in trying to believe something
yet not in a way that it fetishizes the believed concept by eventually stopping
the act of investigation but rather one will always perceive the idea that the
continuity of skeptical investigation will not end that easily.
Nonetheless,
if such continuity of skeptical investigation ought to diminished, Rogers
stated that it is situated by “simply a difference of interest” (pg. 630). “No
man is a sceptic in every direction” he stated, “Few men are sceptics in the
special field which they have made their own” (pg. 629). This further
elaborated identification of skepticality by Rogers is indeed interesting as we
ought to uncover similar degree of arbitrariness within this whole ‘system’ of
skeptical approach with one that language situates. Such assumption is solely
based on the situation where a manifestation of skeptical approach determined
by one’s interest towards certain problems. The sense of arbitrariness is then
situated by the relevance of one’s interest upon such matter as the idea of
interest itself is generally arbitrary in a way that it correlates with the
variety of perceptions, and of course interest, that a person may carry. Thus,
we ought to say that the continuity of skeptical approach upon certain topic is
artificial, or a product of the manufacture between one’s interest and
perspective towards the particular problems—as it is somehow impossible for
every men to have exactly similar interest, considering the plurality of their
respective perspectives.
Skepticality
of Structure
“…up to the event which
I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of
structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or
reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a
point of presence, fixed origin” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1206).
As it has been
mentioned before in Thorsrud’s explanation about the term skeptical—or skepsis, the idea of being skeptical is
related to an urge or an act of investigation which is constructed by
discovering the possibility of mistakes or incompatible explanation about
something. In his writing “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the
Human Sciences” (1966), Derrida has shown the elaboration of his own further
enquiries and investigation towards Saussure’s concept about structure as he
seems to be skeptical on how the idea and the term structure is made and used.
Even
though Derrida is aware the idea of creating a center and the existence of a
center within the structure, rather than accepting those following situations,
he was questioning the condition of the structurality itself as he enquired
about how it “has always been neutralized or reduced” by “a process of giving
it a center or of referring it to a point of presence” which seems to be ironic
as the idea of constructing a center, in hoping to ‘organize’ its
structurality, ended up decreasing its own value as the center somehow
prohibits its own structure from anything but its own, just like what Derrida
has said that “the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we
might call the play of the structure”
(2004: 1206). It is indeed intriguing if we are talking about “the play of the structure” as the idea
somehow implies that the structurality of the structure prevented itself to
tamper around with its own structurality which is also limiting the idea of
developing and enhancing as it somehow forbids external interference towards
the construction of its structurality. In a way, this condition also implies
that we could not be skeptical when we are discussing about such matter—the
matter of structure—which is somehow difficult as the basic idea of being
skeptical, the idea of being curious to investigate something further, is one
of the nature of human being. Even though there will be some who only embrace
his own curiosity without doing anything about it, as it has been elaborated
about such possibility by the existence of correlation between the desire to
continue one’s skeptical enquiries with one’s interests, still the concept of
center in structure will become a hurdle for those who are willing to decipher
or ‘tamper’—as a result of one’s curiosity—with the structurality of structure
itself.
“Formalist find
ambiguity and irony; deconstructors find contradiction and
undecidability…post-structuralists celebrate the apparently limitless
possibilities for the production of meaning that come about when the language
of the critic enters the language of the text” (Miller in Murfin, 1989: 204-5)
Derrida’s
idea on deconstruction has led many
deconstructors to utilize his concept of deconstructing in deciphering,
analyzing, or simply discussing any matter related to the language—as the
concept of deconstruction begins with
Derrida’s enquiries towards Saussure’s idea about structure of language, or
linguistic unit. As the process of deconstruction
requires one to defamiliarize and to deconstruct an idea within language,
especially in form of a text or literary text, as Miller said that “both the
formalist and the deconstructor focus on the literary text” (1989: 204) one
ought to discover the “contradiction” and “undecidability” within the text
which will become their main concern of the text.
If
we are to correlate this situation and mind-frame back to the idea of
skepticality, the term “contradiction” and “undecidability” seem to be in a
relation with the term “deception” and “error” which Thorsrud has explained
both as the elements of skeptical investigation. A deception can be considered
as an idea which cause us to be led into something that is not valid—as it may
possesses arguable degree of its sense of argumentation and so on—and an error
carries similar attributes with a deception as it is also something that
possesses an arguable value in its conduct and its own argumentation. In a way,
both “deception” and “error” seem to be a part of “contradiction” as the
arguable or doubtful value that both terms possess will eventually lead into a
matter of contradiction as those arguable and doubtful value may contradict
with another idea under the same concept or certain relevance with any other
matter. To some degree, those contradictions may possess some probabilities to
influence the sense of ‘undecidability’ on the respective matter or problem as
it doubts one’s perception about something by the existence of both deception
and error that contradicts with one previous awareness or understanding about
similar matter. From this situation alone we could assume that the idea of
“contradiction” and “undecidability”, which are the issues that a deconstructor
tries to discover in a text, carry an essence of both the terms “deception” and
“error” which are the crucial elements in the skeptical investigation. Thus, it
is possible for us to assume that there is a kind of interchangeable
correlation between those terms as one seems to contribute a portion of its core
idea to the other.
Moving
further into Miller’s elaboration, he did mention that “the post-structuralists
break with formalists”, yet again, “over an issue” which “involves metaphor and
metonymy”, both of which are “two terms for different kinds of rhetorical
“tropes” or figures of speech” (1989, 205). What has emerged to our concern is
not about the metaphor, but the enigmatic metonymy. Miller followed up his
elaboration with a brief identification that “Metonymy refers to a figure that is chosen to stand for something
that it is commonly associated with…” (pg. 205), yet with this explanation
alone we ought to uncover a slight implication on how metonymy contains a
certain degree of arbitrariness, in relation to how it is previously explained
that there is an existence of skepticality within this manifestation of
Derrida’s deconstruction. The
possibility of such preposition refers back to the idea of how metonymy is
simply a figure, chosen to stand for something, “that is commonly associated
with” as the requirement of which to be assigned with something that has
certain degree of association, with the term ‘commonly’, situates yet another
symptom of arbitrariness as it implies a certain condition of uncertainty where
it will require an arbitrary correlation between the figure and the thing that
is being ‘figured’ up by metonymy; similar to the correlation, or artificial
correlation that exist between skepticality and one’s interest, or between
signifier and signified.
Skepticality of Text
“What constitutes the
Text is, on the contrary (or precisely), its subversive force in respect of the
old classifications...If the Text poses problems of classifications…it always
involves a certain experience of limits” (Barthes, 1977: 157).
Following
Barthes’ elaboration regarding the range which Text has in term of expanding
and applying its system, functions, etc. through his writings “From Work to
Text” in one of his renown Image, Music,
Text (1977), we ought to perceive the fundamental elements with which Text constitutes
itself is its own revolt towards the old classifications—which seem to refer
towards the generic classifications like genre, periodical relevance, etc.
Nonetheless, this identification alone situates an implication that Text
carries a sense of skepticality as its attempt to subvert the pre-existent
system of classifications correlates with the idea of how skeptical
investigation lead to “a distrust of finality” (Rogers, 1904: 631).
Text
tries to defy the old classification as the system of classification itself
signifies a kind of finality in a way that it has become the only cabinet in
which works, writings, discourses are categorized. Even though we ought to
accept such mean of categorizing as it does simplify the problematic and
enigmatic process of classification, Text recognizes such situation as “a
certain experience of limits” (1977: 157). To consider such simplification—the
old system of classification—as a limit may be problematic within a perspective
of certain group of people, yet it is not entirely a mistake considering the
plurality—about which Barthes did elaborate further in the
writings—intricacies, and complexities that Text does contain in its
construction, function and manifestation. It reminded us on how ironic the structurality of structure is, if we
perceive such matter under a correlation with Derrida’s perspective that is.
Nonetheless, this condition alone somehow signifies that the general influence
for Text to distrust the finality of old classification system is its own awareness
in uncovering the contradiction and deception of such system which is
implemented through the limitation that Text experienced. We could say that
Text’s awareness is an awareness and even a manifestation of skepticality or
skeptical approach and investigation which it vividly applies towards the old
classification system.
Later
in his writings, while elaborating under the same idea regarding Text—of its
range, thing that constitutes Text—Barthes mentioned that “the Text is always paradoxical” (pg. 158). It is indeed
another identification that Barthes pointed out regarding the constitution of a
Text. And it is indeed intriguing as if we refer to the term ‘paradoxical’, or
‘paradox’, the general comprehension of such term signifies a condition where
Text is able situate a binary contradictions regarding its own constitution yet
each of which is possible to be considered as valid. Barthes did mention
similar idea in “The Death of the Author” (1977), saying that “We know now that
a text is…a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of
them original, blend and clash” (1977: 146). In other words, Text situates both
sense of arbitrariness and uncertainty within its own constitutions in a way
that even though it provides contradictory elements yet both of which are
capable to be valid. It is a dimension where its own constitutions, that comes
in a form of variety of writings, “blend and clash”; it contradicts one another
yet its own validity blend with each other as well. It is indeed a correlation
with the sense of arbitrary as the outcome of its constitution may vary unless
one applies a particular and specific ideas towards it.
The
arbitrariness of Text is magnified once again as Barthes also pointed out that
“The logic regulating the text is not comprehensive but metonymic” (pg. 158).
As the problematic and enigmatic features of the term metonymy, or metonymic,
along with its arguable correlation with arbitrariness has been mentioned
earlier in this writings, we could imply that “the logic regulating the text”
is also arbitrary. Its arbitrariness is a product that is manufactured by the
arbitrary value lying within the figure of metonymy, situating the idea that
the logic of the text runs with a system which is commonly associated with
particular matters—as it relates to the construction of metonymy.
“A text is made of
multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into mutual relation
of dialogue…but there is tane place where this multiplicity is focused and that
place is the reader” (Barthes, 1977: 148)
From
Barthes elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), what we could imply
from the “tane place” which is “the reader” is the idea that even though the
text itself is indeed multi-dimensional, complex, filled with contradictions,
etc. it is simply arbitrary as that one thing that is able to focus the text is
the reader. It reminded us to the relation between skepticality and one’s
desire to fully commit in investigating particular matter using the skeptical
approach as the text is correlated to the reader; one who will eventually take
part in threading its own woven fabric of multi-dimensional ideas.
Skepticality of Writing and
Literature
“…writing is the destruction of every
voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique
space where our subject slips away…” (Barthes, 1977: 142)
Again
referring to Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977), what has become the concern of his
elaboration above is the idea of how a writing “is the destruction of” not
focusing my interest towards ‘voice’, but “every point of origin”. The term
‘origin’ upon the object of writing’s destruction is intriguing in a way that
it carries similar sense that of the old classification system that a text
tries to subvert. It is similar in a way that both text and writing is trying
to defy an idea of finality which is implemented in the old classification
system and the every point of origin. The value of finality, particularly in
relation to writing, is signified by the idea of origin as it does contain
similar sense to old in the old classification system as both carry similar
sense of periodical relevance.
With
the idea of the destruction towards every point of origin that is relevant to
the matter of writing, it does not only imply the idea that writing contains a
certain degree of skepticality which is manifested by its distrust towards
every point of origin, but the way that Barthes used the term ‘destruction’, or
‘to destruct’ can be considered as another point of signification towards the
skepticality of writing as it implies the idea that writing is committing
itself towards to the situation where it does not accept, or simply defies, one
point of origin as one that possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to the
other. It applies such approach by destructing, scattering, every point of
origin thus putting itself nowhere—regarding its perspective, as it tries to
not be influence by external sources other than itself—but the place of its own
existence; it may sound similar to Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, yet it is simply to “de” the structure of every
point of origin, as it refers to the idea of simply scattering the structure of
the origin.
Furthermore,
the term ‘neutral’ which is used as one of its identification in Barthes’
writings conducts a problematic implication as it is indeed generally
problematic to consider one idea as ‘neutral’, to consider writing as so, as
the language which is clearly the fundamental elements of writing itself is
arbitrary, thus defying any possibility regarding the existence of ‘neutral’
perspective. Yet, if we do perceive the word ‘neutral’ as a situation where one
situates an open-mindedness in a sense that it has the will to accept various proposition,
and to assess each of those presuppositions of idea as equally valid, the
existence of the word is not entirely problematic but merely a manifestation
of, yet again, the sense of skepticality.
However,
it is enigmatic to relate such skepticality if we do observe the sentence
“where our subject slips away” as it somehow defies the idea of arbitrariness
that skepticality carries alongside its state of uncertainty. The arbitrariness
seems to be diminished in a way that the subject, “our subject” is being
detached from the writing itself. The subject is significant in relation to the
concept of skepticality as it is the closest element on which we can correlate
the variety of interest in conducting such skeptical approach. Yet, later in
his writings, as it has been mentioned before, the vocal point of arbitrariness
in writing, or text in general, is switched over upon the perception of the
readers as they have the ability and the possibility, according to Barthes’
elaboration in “The Death of the Author” (1977), to take part in the complexity
of the text, signifying their importance towards the construction of the text,
and somehow correlate with the arbitrariness that text contains.
Moving
our attention from the so-called ‘general’ writing towards the whole
intricacies, structure and construction of literature, I wish not to confront
my elaboration upon the enigmatic question that says “what is literature?”
followed by the opinion that “isn’t such inquiries signify a skeptical approach
towards literature?” but to merely address the skepticality that is involved
with the whole construction and system of literature, as it is generally
discussing the skepticality ‘in’ literature, not the skeptical approach that
one may have ‘against’ or ‘towards’ literature. Yet, the elaboration will not
approach another problematic matter of “which one is considered as a work of
literature?” as in correlation with the previous explanation—from language to
writing—we ought to be aware that we are now the participant of discourse as we
are both indirectly and directly taking part in discussing such matter, hence
we should have recognize literature as a text of literature, not merely a work
of literature, meaning that we would not get ourselves involved with the
problem of marginalizing the literature based on its ‘quality’—the term itself
is already problematic—periods, authors, genres, and so on. These following
propositions are merely a kind of guideline for the elaboration which will
follow.
“…writing ceaselessly
posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systemic exemption
of meaning. In precisely this way literature (it would be better from now on to
say writing), by refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning, to the text
(and to the world as text), liberates what may be called an anti-theological
activity” (Barthes, 1977: 147).
Through
the following elaboration, it is exploited that a writing continuously and
vigorously puts meaning in an attempt to finally eliminate the existence of the
meaning itself; creating a system that is freed from the duty of providing and
elaborating meaning(s). As the boundaries between writing and literature is
somehow diminished, by the existence of such explanation within the brackets, literature
is also conducting the exact process of “ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly
to evaporate it” thus implying the idea that “by refusing to assign a ‘secret’”
or “an ultimate meaning”, literature “liberates what may be called an
anti-theological activity”. Even without any further and specified elaboration,
we could uncover the correlation of such activity that acts against the
existence of an ultimate meaning with the idea of skepticality, the one that
situates one to perceive every single thing as validly equal, or in other yet
similar sense, it situates a distrust towards the finality which is represented
by the idea of an ultimate meaning. It is an act “to refuse to fix meaning”
(pg. 147).
Skepticality and Feminine Textual
Body
As
we refer back to the matter presented in the beginning of this writing, while
using the elaboration of the preceding paragraphs concerning the fundamental
comprehension which I have established upon related matter, we ought to
perceive similar manifestation of skepticality within the idea of a feminine
textual body.
“A
feminine text starts on all sides at once, starts twenty times, thirty times,
over” (Cixous, 1981: 53)
When
we look at this particular characteristic, or perhaps, at one of the
fundamental basis upon the idea of a feminine textual body, the situation of
how it begins from “all sides” conducts a multitude of possibilities which can be manipulated by each respective writer of
a feminine text to elaborate particular ideas or topic which they have in mind.
It also situates a high degree of plurality, or variety in terms of the
abundant interests, opinions, and individual elaborations being written through
the feminine textual body. However, this particular attribute of a feminine
text is also relatable towards the sense of arbitrariness—which have been one
of the main concern of my previous writing, and elaboration in the preceding
paragraphs. It is indeed arbitrary in a way that such existence of possibilities, manifested through the
plurality of individual elaborations through the feminine textual body,
indicate the possibilities for each writer to enrich their own ideas in a feminine
text; the ideas that is suitable and in correlation with their own interests.
Yet, the feminine text, of the feminine textual body, is also arbitrary in a
sense that its elaboration is not intentionally specified upon certain matter,
but it may be discussing several issues at the same time, as it “starts on all
sides”, and more importantly, “at once” (Cixous, 1981: 53).
Furthermore,
the idea of how a feminine text “starts on all sides at once” (Cixous, 1981: 53)
could implicate an assumption that the feminine textual body considers “all
sides”, all things to be as important as any other in a way that the variety of
“sides” become the starting point, the beginning of constructing a feminine
text. We could say that this particular condition is in correlation with one of
the fundamentals of skepticality that is “the definite position that he has no
reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904:
628), as the feminine textual body has no reason, or perhaps, has the reason to
not accept any one “side” as true above any other “sides”—hence the idea of
starting from all sides. It signifies the idea that every single side that
exists is equally valid with one another; valid in a sense that all of which
can be manipulated as the starting point, or points, in constructing a feminine
text.
“These are texts that
work on the beginning but not on the origin. The origin is a masculine myth”
(Cixous, 1981: 53).
This particular
fundamentals of the feminine textual body is somehow in correlation with
Barthes’ idea on how “writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point
of origin” (1977: 142) as even though Cixous did not specifically use the term
‘destruction’ towards the idea of origin, the ignorance of the feminine text
over the origin—especially as it is considered as a masculine myth—signifies
similar sense as the feminine text avoid any kind of manipulation over the
origin; a seemingly less-harsh way to say that the feminine textual body is
bluntly trying to defy the masculine myth of origin itself.
Its
deviance towards origin, in a way, can be considered as an act to defy the
formerly-established conception of origin; formerly-established in a sense that
origin will somehow always be correlated with the preceding establishments of
such idea, the historical elements of such idea. Similar to the similar
conception of how both text and writing are also trying to defy the so-called
establishment of origin, just like what Barthes has elaborated in his writings.
Nonetheless, this condition also can be associated with, again, Rogers’ idea on
how skepticality is closely associated with “the crystallization of the
attitude of a distrust of finality” (1904: 631). We could then consider the
idea of origin—the masculine myth of origin—in the construction of feminine
textual body as the formerly established comprehension of finality, while the
deviance of the feminine text as the crystallization of its own distrust
towards the aforementioned finality. It is indeed a manifestation of distrust
as the situation of how it vividly avoids the manipulation of the masculine
origin is simply a manifestation of the distrust, the doubt that a feminine or
a feminine text has towards the idea of origin;the fundamentals of feminine
textual body itself are solely in correlation with the idea of finally taking
significant action, a some kind of revolt towards the establishment and endless
manifestation of masculinity.
“When a woman writes in
nonrepression she passes on her others, her abundance of non-ego/s in a way
that destroys the form of the family structure, so that it is defamiliarized”
(Cixous, 1981: 53).
Closely
in association with the manifestation of skepticality within the feminine
textual body, that is the one concerning the crystallization of distrust upon
the idea of masculine origin, the destruction of the form of the family can
also be considered as one of the manifestation of similar reasoning. Yet, it is
also different from the previous form of manifestation as this particular idea vividly
signifies the attempt to destroy, to defamiliarize the family structure.
If
we hear the word ‘defamiliarize’ we ought to correlate such matter with
Derrida’s elaboration regarding deconstruction.
In the preceding paragraph, especially the one that lies under the chapter of
‘skepticality of structure’, it has been pointed out that his concern towards
the structurality of structure
situates an approach that requires a decentering, or a deconstruction towards
the establishment of structure itself. In other words, such approach tends to defamiliarize the whole concept of
structure in an attempt to defy a finality of the so-called structure. Thus,
similar sense of defamiliarization ought to be perceived within the
non-repressed woman’s writings as it conducts an attempt to destroy, to
defamiliarize the form of the family structure.
With
the comprehension of the correlation between the idea of deconstruction and the manifestation of distrust by defamiliarizing
the form of the family structure within the feminine textual body, we ought to
consider the feminine text as what Cixous has also pointed out that “a feminine
text can’t be predicted, isn’t predictable, isn’t know able and is therefore
very disturbing” (1981: 53). One of the conditions which contributes to its
unpredictability is, of course, the establishment of defamiliarization,
alongside the sense of skepticality which those manifestation contain, that
situate certain degree of possibility to deconstruct the former conception
regarding structure, the family structure, into something that would be
relatable to one’s interest—again showing symptom of skeptical arbitrariness. This
particular conception runs in correlation with Miller’s explanation on how
“deconstructors find contradiction and undecidability” (in Murfin, 1989: 204-5)
as the term ‘undecidability’ is a metonymy for ‘unpredictability’ which lies
beneath the defamiliarization of feminine text, and both ought to be considered
as the manifestation of, again, the crystallized distrusts upon finality that
is contained within skepticality.
“All the feminine texts
I’ve read are very close to the voice…perhaps because there’s something in them
that’s freely given, perhaps because they don’t rush into meaning” (Cixous,
1981: 54).
Furthermore,
the unpredictability of feminine textual body is being enhanced in terms of its
complexity as it attempts to not “rush into meaning”. Concerning the mentioning
of meaning, we ought to refer back to Barthes’ explanation on how “in precisely
this way literature (it would be better from now on to say writing), by
refusing to assign a ‘secret’, an ultimate meaning” (1977: 147) as both carry
similar interests towards meaning itself.
Barthes’
idea of how writing refuses to manifest an ultimate meaning vividly signifies
its distrust towards the finality, the finality induced from the existence of
an ultimate meaning, while the feminine textual body implicates its own
distrust by conducting anattempt to avoid the meaning itself, implying an act
of slightest deviance towards the importance, or the finality of meaning, yet
again. Both seems to indicate similar degree of repulsion towards the
establishment of meaning, the establishment of semanticality upon words. And both
seems to carry similar degree, and form of manifestation over skepticality by
putting a unison interest upon meaning, the enigmatic meaning, as an object
upon which they point, they manifest their doubt, implying nothing but a
significant distrust towards the problematic matter of meanings.
All
the preceding elaborations are the form of interest which I do have upon the
matter of skepticality. All of which are merely simple indications upon the
existence of skepticality within the studies of both language and literature.
Though perhaps I now have made a step—or perhaps a misleading step—closer
towards the actual manifestation of the two, even though I was merely wandering
my way around influential—at least for my own interest—discourses, not doing
the slightest touch upon its significant influence within the existent
writings. Yet it is reassuring to somehow decrease the arbitrariness that lies
beneath my own construction of words, sentences, punctuations, etc. as I have
managed to point out the skepticality that is buried beneath the concern
towards femininity, or toward the problematic “feminism”. Nonetheless, it is
indeed such an intrigue to wander among the path of unpredictability, finding a
kind of way between the harshness yet mischievous realm of undecidability,
paving the road upon the endless road of skepticality.
Work Cited:
Barthes, Roland. 1977. “From Work to Text” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 155-164). Great Britain: Fontana
Press
1977. “The Death of the Author” in Image, Music, Text (1977; pg. 142-148).
Great Britain: Fontana Press
Derrida,
Jacques. 1966. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”
in Critical Theory Since Plato ed.
Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3rd edition; pg. 1206-1215).
United States: Wadsworth Publishing.
Miller,
J. Hillis.1989. “A Deconstructive Critic at Work” in Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness: A Case Study in
Contemporary Criticism ed. Murfin, Ross C. (1989). New York: St. Martin’s
Press
Rogers, A. K. 1904. “Scepticism” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13 No. 6.
North Carolina, United States: Duke University Press.
Thorsrud, Harald. 2009. Ancient
Scepticism. Stocksflied, England: Acumen.
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