When we look at the
word ‘authority’, standing by its own self, we tend to correlate the term with
the context concerning regulation, power, and all of its corresponding
synonyms. However, if we do take the time to look further, we can take away the
word ‘author’ for the term. It is indeed interesting because ‘author’ does
contain a rather significant correlation with language, and especially
literature. Nonetheless, these are merely assumptions, of mine that is, which I
would like to uncover much further in the following paragraphs of this
writings.
As
an early precaution, I do not wish to intentionally or unintentionally
emphasizes and specified the elaboration upon certain well-known issues like
feminism, post-structuralism, colonialism, post-colonialism, and so on but it
is merely an attempt to point out the correlating ideas within the references
that is in association with the main concern that is concerning
“authority”—again, not solely on its general meaning, but further. Yet I am not
going to be able to restrict myself—entirely—from sounding like I am indeed
emphasizing certain issue, the aforementioned well-known issues, even though it
would also be difficult to separate such elaboration, explanation and
preposition from the context of such, again, well-known issues.
Matters
of Authority
Before we put our
attention towards the references which would be elaborated through these
following paragraphs, I would like to somehow establish the kind of “authority”
that would become the main concern of this writings.
Generally
speaking, the term “authority” refers—to my comprehension—to the idea of
regulation, one that holds the ‘rights’ to regulate something. According to Oxford’s
Online Dictionary[1],
the term refers to “the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and
enforce obedience”. However, in correlation with what I will be elaborating and
explaining about upon this writings, the term “authority” will primarily refers
to “the power to influence others, especially because of one’s commanding
manner or one’s recognized knowledge about something”. Again, these preceding
references towards the dictionary is merely another precaution or starting
point. Hopefully it will not become the main reference upon my further
elaboration.
“The Orient is an
integral part of European material
civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part
culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting
institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial
bureaucracies and colonial styles” (Said in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1370).
In
one of his influential writings, entitled “Orientalism” (1978), Edward Said
pointed out that orientalism, which
is an idea that the Orientals, usually refers to the people of eastern country,
or to be more specific, previously-colonized country, is “a place of romance,
exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experience” (pg.
1370), is formed as a manifestation of European physical evidence of
“civilization” and culture.
Referring
to the idea of “authority”, we ought to perceive that the idea of orientalism nor the existence of the
Orient is an outcome from the authority that the European possesses as the side
who literally holds bigger power, both physical and mental power, over the
respective Orient. Interestingly enough, the sense of authority, which was being
presented or merely implied from the aforementioned situation, is not simply
portrayed by the so-called imperialism which occur at the time when the whole
process of “colonization” starts upon the Orient, but also the subsequent
manipulation through the existence of orientalism,
and even “discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship,
imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” (pg.
1370).
It
is indeed interesting to see how a thing as simple as an idea—somehow—does have
the ability to influence the framework of not only the respective side who
physically experience the whole process of the so-called imperialism, through
colonization, but also the one who has not been involved in such matter. In
other words, it also affects the perspective or point of view of the people
from the outside of the particular situation.
Such
condition ought to signify the idea of how one’s dominance over something else
could be effectively presented while also preserving the existence of the idea
itself. Yet, if we look at it further, it somehow situates a subsequent
situation where the application of such method is not merely to preserve but,
in a way, enhance, develop and nourish the sense of both dominance and
authority to be even ‘better’, even though it would be difficult to ignore the
dominance of such presence even without the help of such long-termed ‘manipulation’.
“I myself believe that
Orientalism is more particularly valuable as a sign of European-Atlantic power
over the Orient than it is as a veridic discourse about the
Orient…Nevertheless, what we must respect and try to grasp is the sheer
knitted-together strength of Orientalist discourse, its very close ties to the
enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and its redoubtable
durability” (Said in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1372).
As
Said pointed out on the preceding quotations, at certain point the existence
and persistence of orientalism does
not only present the manifestation of the ‘authority’ of the west but also the
importance and significance of the Orientalist discourse, even though we will
face a certain degree of difficulty in finally uncovering the aforementioned
elements of the Orientalist without ignoring the influential manifestation of
West upon it.
However,
in certain context of the matter, the appearance of the Orientalist discourse
itself tends to, again, signifies and magnifies the authority of its respective
side that is the West. It seems to be ironic yet it is somehow logical. Said
mentioned that “…the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its
contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (pg. 1370), yet again,
implying the situation where the possibility of Orientalist discourse to exist
is merely a ramification of West’s ‘authority’ through constructing such
elaborate imagery, state of mind, perspective and point of view, all of which
latter produces a beneficial outcomes upon its persistence and existence of
authority. But, if we look at this particular situation with another point of
view—kind of—the idea of providing the Orient to present their own discourse is
interesting yet problematic in a way that in one side it does provide the
possibility for the Orient to elaborate their own discourse through the
persistent Orientalist, in a way, this situates a leak of ‘authority’ from the
Occident for the Orient in a sense that they are able to elaborate and present
their own ideas and influence. On the other side, however, this possibility
tends to either directly or indirectly enhance and signify the ‘authority’ of
the Occident as they are the one who gives the Orient means to present and
elaborate their own ideas; in other words, it situates an idea that the Orient
exists because of the Occident, and then the existence of the Occident ought to
be enriched by the existence of the Orient itself.
Authority and ‘Power’
Upon
the sentences of the preceding ‘chapter’ of this writing, it has been pointed
out that one of the implication which the term “authority” induces is the idea of
“the power or right to give orders, make decisions, and enforce obedience”.
This association alone is already an evidence of the relation established
between authority and the problem of power—even though it is merely general
conception, as it is an ‘explanation’ given by the paradigmatic dictionary.
“It is a question of
what governs statements, and the way
in which they govern each other so as
to constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable…In
short, there is a problem of the régime, the politics of the scientific
statement” (Foucault in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1271).
In
the elaboration of one of his interviews, which later is known, published, and entitled
“Truth and Power” (1977), Michael Foucault pointed out that there is a problem in
the development of statements and prepositions—in contrasts towards the idea of
how it should’ve developed in a way that does not disturb the ‘peace’ and the
pace of its development—show the symptom of “extent and rapidity” which “are
only the sign of something else: a modification in the rules of formation of
statements” (pg. 1271).
According
to Foucault’s perspective, the aforementioned condition concerning the extent
and rapidity in the development of statements, prepositions, even discourses are
associated with the question about the ‘system’ that lies under the process of
regulating such form of presenting one’s ideas about certain interests or
topics. Yet, if we put this particular conception within another point of view,
we ought to perceive a condition that it is simply a matter of ‘authority’
which governs the distribution, elaboration and production of statements,
prepositions and discourses in its manifestation to tamper with the flow of
development that the following form of idea ‘expression’ had before. But,
regarding the idea of ‘power’, which is the purposely main concern of this
particular part of this writing, it does not explicitly point out the idea
relating to power, and all of its manifestation. It rather emphasizes the
importance and existence of régime which is closely related to the system of
authority, system of regulation upon the production of statements, even though
it somehow implies the presence of ‘power’ as the matter concerning régime,
authority and regulation ought to be associated with the matter of power.
In
addition, it is intriguing to see how the whole process of producing statements,
prepositions, and discourses ended up to be manipulated to fit the label ‘scientifically
acceptable’. The term ‘acceptable’ seems to be problematic in a way that it
magnifies and emphasizes the need to govern one’s statement as it ought to
increase the difficulty in terms of creating something—statements,
prepositions, discourses, etc.—as it has to be sufficient and in compliance with
the acceptability of the society, or certain context and environment of a
particular matter. This whole situation, in a way, also signifies the régime related
problem and its association with the production of a statement as it does
induce its influence with the existence of certain ‘requirements’ for a
statement to become acceptable.
“What makes power hold
good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on
us as a force that says no, but that it traverse and produces things, it
induces pleasures, forms knowledge, produces discourses” (Foucault in Adams and
Searle, 2004: 1273).
Further
in his elaboration, Foucault also pointed out that even with all problems and
intricacies that the conception of power does possess, it persists through with
the ‘benefits’ that it can situate and produce. Though it is somehow a problem
to call it as a benefit, but it is indeed a condition that we can’t detach ourselves
from. Its outcomes are essentials to our own sakes in a way it directly
correlates with pleasure and knowledge; two of the most fundamental aspects
that a human may have. And, whether we like it or not, the power itself is
essential to the actual production of discourses in a sense that, as it has
been mentioned about earlier, its existence situates the regulation or régime
upon the production of discourses as both of which are situated in a kind of
correlation with one another; the production of discourse does require a kind
of ‘regulation’ for it to become something that is scientifically acceptable. The
ironic correlation—ironic in a way of going against a totalitarian and
universalist ‘power’—of power, society, and the production of discourse ended
up to be, as Foucault has said, “a productive network which runs through the whole
social body” (pg. 1273-4).
The ‘Authority’ of Author
Moving
on from the matters of “authority” within authority, we are now going to put
our attention towards the association between author and ‘authority’. Generally
speaking, we ought to find a kind of correlation between the two terms as the
word “author” is a part of the term “authority”. Even so, according to Oxford’s
Online Dictionary[2],
the term “author” refers to not only the idea of “a writer of a book, article,
or document” but also “an originator of a plan or idea”. What has become
interesting is the reference towards the word “originator” which means the one
who becomes the ‘origin’ of a plan or idea.
“The third point
concerning this “author-function” is that it is not formed spontaneously
through the simple attribution of a discourse to an individual. It results from
a complex operation whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we call
an author” (Foucault in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1265)
As
we try to escape the general comprehension about “author”—providing a slight
more valid opinion upon the matter—in one of his writings entitled “What Is an
Author?” (1969), Michael Foucault pointed out that we ought to categorize with
all of its ‘function’ the author according to the type of a text on which it’s
appointed through as Foucault believed that each type of text situate a
different ‘function’ for its respective author.
Regarding
the author of a discourse, Foucault mentioned that its function, of an ‘author’
is not as simple as we may always think—assigning the author as the one who
‘writes’ the text—but it is produced through a slightly complex process of
construction which situates the idea of “rational entity” that we will call as
an author. But, it is not also a general construction of rational entity that
we may easily perceive but it is “a “realistic” dimension as we speak of an
individual’s “profundity” or “creative” power, his intentions or the original
inspiration manifested in writing” (pg. 1265). In other words, the function of
the author in the realm of discourse is easily associated with the physical
construction of a somewhat subjective, in a way that it is closely related with
the individual aspect, matter of the author such as one’s “intentions”,
“original inspiration” or in another term, one’s interests about something. The
following formation of the individual aspect is obviously not manifested in its
literal form as there are plenty ways for one to manipulate his own ‘language’
within his writing, just as what Foucault has said that “these aspects of an
individual, which we designate as an author (or which comprise an individual as
an author), are projections, in terms always more or less psychological, of our
way of handling texts” (pg. 1265). It is simply a matter of how one manipulate
his or her interest, inspiration and ideas through letters, words, and
sentences within their writings.
“The “author-function”
is tied to the legal and institutional systems that circumscribe, determine,
and articulate the realm of discourses…The distinctive contribution of these
authors is that they produced not only their own work, but the possibility and the
rules of formation of other texts” (Foucault in Adams and Searle, 2004:
1266).
Further
on his elaboration, Foucault believed that later in its subsequent
manifestation or actualization of the aforementioned “author-function”, it will
correlate with the “legal and institutional systems” that regulate the whole
network of discourses in a way that it somehow becomes the elements upon the
formation of the authority that manages the matter of discourse. If we refer
back to the elaboration of ‘authority’ earlier in this writings, we ought to
perceive a correlation between ‘authority’ and ‘author’, or in this case
“author-function”, as according to the Foucault’s preceding explanation, the
“author-function” itself ought to be associated with the “legal and institutional
system” within the realm of discourses; signifying the idea that the function
of the author will later be correlated or involved in the formation of
regulations within the realm of discourses. That condition itself is highly
comparable to the matter of ‘authority’; the ‘authority’ of the
“author-function” which will become one of the factor upon the ‘legal and
institutional’ matter of discourse.
In
addition, the involvement of “author-function” is not merely relatable upon the
regulation that occurs within the realm of discourse but also “the possibility
and the rules of formation of other texts” (pg. 1266). In other words, the
“author-function” does not only situate their ‘influence’ towards the system of
regulation within the matter of discourses but also spread their involvement
and significance towards the likeliness and form regulation of other types of
text. This condition does not only signify the idea of how complex the system
and interrelation of text is—or language if we to put it in a more general
term—but also it implicates the ‘authority’, that such “author-function”
possesses, which is manipulated and being spread through its involvement and
influence upon the regulation of other texts.
“Subjectivity, then, is
linguistically and discursively constructed and displaced across the range of
discourse in which the concrete individual participates…The subject is
constructed in language and in discourse and, since the symbolic order in its
discursive use is closely related to ideology, in ideology” (Belsey in Con
Davis and Schleifer, 1994: 358).
It
has been mentioned before that “author-function”, according to Foucault’s
elaboration, is associated with a physical formation which is constructed by an
individual matter relating one’s intentions, inspirations and interest upon
certain issue or problem within the realm of discourse. Derived from the
aforementioned involvement of such individual aspects within the text under the
realm of discourse, Catherine Belsey’s elaboration in her writings entitled “Constructing the Subject:
Deconstructing the Text” (1994) can be considered to be pointing out similar
sense of ‘individuality’ that is contained within the idea of “subjectivity”;
in a way that individual-related matter is perceived to have a correlation with
the state of being ‘subjective’, as in to position one as a subject who both
‘physically’ and ‘mentally’ present his ideas through one’s own preposition,
thus implying a further relation between individual matter and its manufactory
subjectivity.
According to Belsey’s point of view upon such
matter, the involvement of subjectivity has existed within wide range of
discourses through linguistic and discursive manipulation. In other words, the
existence of subjective value upon discourses have been situated through the
manipulation of language and expansion which will be solely related to the
‘author’ of each respective discourse in a sense that the ‘author’ will be the
one who carries the ‘authority’ to utilize such means and manifestation of
one’s subjectivity through the text which the ‘author’ has constructed. In
addition, further in her elaboration, Belsey pointed out that the discursive approach
which was used to manifest the subjectivity upon the discourse is closely
associated with the matter of ideology. What has become the interesting point
of this remark is the relation between one’s subjectivity, through the
linguistic and discursive approach, with the matter of ideology as both
signifies similar significance towards the matter of ideas and interest. Yet,
the ideological matters seem to be problematic in a way that such problem
usually correlates with its of manifestation through influence which one may
have in a sense the matter concerning ideology, either in direct or indirect
manner, ought to be presented by an exchange of influence between two
respective who carry different perspective and framework of ideology situated
with manipulation of language—within the realm of discourse—in an attempt to
‘physically’ and ‘mentally’ construct each manipulation of their ideology. Even
though most of the time it will not be in a form of an exchange, especially
when we’re talking about the matter of discourse, as the manifestation of both
ideology and its influential ramification will only be constructed upon a text
which does not have the possibility to receive direct feedback, or to situate
such exchange, as it is indeed, merely, a text.
“These are texts that
work on the beginning but not on the origin. The origin is a masculine myth”
(Cixous, 1981: 53).
In
one of her most influential writings, entitled “Castration or Decapitation?”
(1981), Hélène Cixous elaborated the idea of how the ‘decapitation of women’—as
in her enigmatic inability to speak, want and even to find her own place—persists and is perceived through
the artificial and deceiving existence of women’s
writing.
Before
we move ourselves towards further discussion about the issue relating to
feminism and all of its intricacies which has been pointed out by Cixous later
in the writings, if we look at the citation above, we already ought to perceive
a symptom of feminism-related issue as Cixous mentioned that the feminine text
works “on the beginning but not on the origin” as “The origin is a masculine
myth” (pg. 53). What has become the point of intrigue upon this remark is how
the idea of origin is related with masculinity, or the manifestation of
problematic patriarchal system. It is
intriguing in a sense that if we look back to one of the general comprehension
of the word “author”, it is said that it correlates to the idea of being an
originator of something, or in other words, the origin of something. From these
situation we could establish an idea that the matter of ‘author’ is closely
related to masculinity in a sense that both implicates the idea of becoming an
origin of something; origin of the text, perhaps, for the ‘author’, and the
origin of certain things for the masculine. Nonetheless, after comprehending
Foucault’s preposition about the intricacies of ‘author’, especially the idea
of how “author-function” is closely related with the idea of regulation within
the system of discourse, we ought to say that its implied conception of
‘authority’ is then in association with sense of masculinity in a way that as
the terms—‘authority’, ‘author’, and its further manifestation of influence and
the becoming of an originator alongside its relation with masculinity—are
engulfed and intertwined with each other.
Such
conception of how the matter of ‘authority’ and ‘author’ is in a way related
with the idea of becoming an originator alongside its relevancies with
masculinity situates a problem, especially if it is correlated with the
intricacies of feminism, as it emphasizes the intricacies between masculinity
and femininity, men and women, etc., just as what Cixous has elaborated in her
writings. She pointed out that “most women”, referring to the so-called women writers, “are like this: they do
someone else’s—man’s—writing, and their innocence sustain it and give it voice”
(1981: 52). The attempt to be able to speak
turns into one of the elements which later signifies the significant influence
of masculinity; leading the formerly good intention to finally speak back into the unrelenting cycle of
masculine interferences. All is caused by the sense of innocence.
It
seems to be ironic in a way that the attempt to finally enhance the existence,
persistence and importance of women
writings ended up to be a benefit for the matter of masculinity itself as
most of the writings tend to extenuate the form which has already been
developed and established—and perhaps manipulated—by the masculine respective. It
ended up to become a continuation of the sense of the ‘authority’ which is
embedded yet manipulated by the matter of masculinity.
‘Exchange’
of Authority
Through the elaboration
within the preceding paragraphs, we ought to perceive the existence of
‘exchange’ concerning authority within the problem relating to colonialism and
feminism with all of its intricacies. Either through the illusion of allowing
the Orient to present their existence through the Orientalist discourse, even
though it ended up utilized as the source of enhancement for the existent
authority of the Occident, in the matter of colonialism, or through the matter
of becoming an ‘author’, or the ‘originator’ which has become the main concern
for the issues relating to feminism.
However,
the intrigues do not stop there, in a way, as the sign of such ‘exchange’ could
also be pointed out within the matter of social system.
“For hegemony supposes
the existence of something which is truly total…and which, as Gramsci put it,
even constitutes the substance and limit of common sense for most people under
its sway…And hegemony has the advantage over general notions of totality, that
it at the same time emphasizes the fact of domination” (Williams in Con Davis
and Schleifer, 1994: 458).
Before
involving ourselves upon the idea of exchange within such problematical
circumstances, we ought to comprehend the sense of ‘authority’ being discussed
and argued upon the matter of hegemony and social-related issues. According to
“Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory” (1994) written by Raymond
Williams, one of the most intriguing matter concerning social problems is the
existence of hegemony.
Hegemony,
in Williams’ point of view, is an idea to create something absolutely total,
supposed in terms of its somewhat ‘infinite’ range concerning control and
regulation. The range is indeed ‘total’ in a way that it even effects the
existence and prohibition regarding one’s common sense due to its own totality.
Hence, it is indeed viable to associate the idea of totalitarian hegemony with
the conception of domination as the notion to construct such total existence
requires and tends to refer towards the sense of ‘authority’. It is even
emphasized through its own correlation with “the fact of domination”. Nonetheless,
it is indeed interesting to see how such notion of totality is closely related
to the common sense of people in the society, and is indeed influential upon
seemingly ‘private’ and psychological problems as common sense itself.
“But if we are to say
this, we have to think again about the sources of that which is not corporate;
of those practices, experiences, meanings, values, which are not part of
effective dominant culture…There is clearly something that we can call
alternative to the effective dominant culture, and there is something else we
can call oppositional in a true sense” (Williams in Con Davis and Schleifer,
1994: 460).
Further
in his elaboration, Williams reminded us that if we ought to consider the
matter of hegemony, the existence of totality, and all of its association with
the concept of domination, we also have to give our thoughts to the matters
“which are not part of effective dominant culture” that include the
“alternative” and the “oppositional”.
What
we call an alternative culture is an idea where “someone who simply finds a
different way to live and wishes to be left alone with it” while the
oppositional culture is a conception where “someone who finds a different way
to live and wants to change the society in its light” (pg. 461).
Let’s
put our attention towards the alternative first. What we could perceive from
Williams’ description of the alternative culture is a signification of a
possibility for one to find one’s own way to live one’s life and to preserve
and utilize one’s own way for one’s self. Yet, if we look at such situation
from a different perspective, we could say that the existence of possibility
for one to situate such condition, in a way, is a ‘leakage’ of authority in a
sense that for one to construct and manipulate such circumstances, that is
finding and keeping his or her own way to live the life, ought to require
certain degree of ‘authority’ in a sense of power in actuating such complex and
elaborate construction.
Similar situation occurs upon the
conception of oppositional culture as well. Yet, even though the oppositional
culture also pointed out the possibility for one to find another way to live
one’s life, it emphasizes on the idea that the respective individual who situated
such circumstances does want to change the way of life of the surrounding
society with his or her own. Again, we could already perceive the similar
‘leakage’ of authority upon this particular idea as it does carry the same idea
of finding a different way of life, just like the alternative one. However, the
oppositional culture implies and signifies a higher amount of ‘leakage’ as it
is simply logical for one to possess a higher degree of ‘authority’, a higher
degree of ‘power’ to be able to influence other beings in the society to
somehow follow his or her own way of life to be manifested into the lives of
the society.
Nonetheless,
if we put our mind back to the idea of the ‘exchange’ within such problematic
elaboration, some may perceive that the exchange that occurred in the preceding
explanation is somehow similar to the one being argued within the previous
discussion concerning feminism and all of its intricacies. The aforementioned
similarities may not be at fault, in a sense that it is indeed comprehensible.
The
idea of the existent alternative and oppositional culture does appear as a
result from the dominance of the effective dominant culture. The two types of
culture which is said to be called as the one that is not part of the effective
dominant culture is indeed a ‘part’ from such dominant idea even though it is
not a direct part of the dominant itself. It is merely a ‘manifestation’.
It
has been mentioned before that the implied ‘authority’ which is given to both
residual culture is a ‘leakage’ of authority from the so-called distant—in term
of its relation with the respective residual culture—effective dominant
culture. It is a leakage in a sense that the fact those residual culture do
exist is already an outcome from the leaked authority because if there is no
‘authority’ within the aforementioned residual culture, they could not exist
and persist.
The
following condition could be considered as similar to the one relating to the
matter of feminism as the ‘residual’ party of both issue—social-related one and
feminism—is given the authority to fight and give out an effort for their own
existence, persistence and importance with certain degree of privilege that is
to find their ‘own’ way in an attempt to ‘argue’ with the effective dominant
culture of each respective matter; hegemony for the social-related issue,
masculinity for the feminism.
However, as I did put these elaborations under
the discussion concerning ‘exchange’, we ought to find yet another implication
upon a form of exchange that occur between the residual culture and the
effective dominant culture. To be called as an exchange, the particular
situation, which is then attributed by the term, has to involve an ‘equal’
trade between the participants of such exchange. Then if we do correlate the
situation between the residual culture and the effective dominant culture with
the preceding preposition we could say that both participants do acquire an
‘equal’ trade of authority out of the ‘exchange’ that they have situated. The
residual culture obviously acquire their own authority to finally situate their
ideas of finding their ‘own’ way out of the problematic domination of totality.
Yet, the effective dominant culture also acquires the same degree of authority,
as the result of the ‘exchange’, in a sense that the whole ‘leakage’ of
authority upon the residual cultures tends to enhance the perception of higher
authority that the effective dominant culture possesses as it is indeed able to
‘share’ their own authority to others, implying the significant amount of
authority and ‘authority’ that the dominant culture actually has.
Authority in Orality
Moving
our attention, briefly, outside of the matter relating to ‘written’ discourse,
or ‘written’ language, its other so-called relative that is the oral or spoken
language is also cluttered and slightly incorporated with the idea of
‘authority’.
“Neither is it
surprising that oral people commonly, and probably universally, consider words
to have great power. Sound cannot be sounding without the use of power…In this
sense, all sound, and especially oral utterance, which comes from inside living
organisms, is ‘dynamic’” (Ong, Walter J., 2002: 32)
We’ve
already established the conception that the term ‘authority’ generally refers
to the rights of regulation and perhaps the influence to do either an indirect
or direct ‘regulation’ upon other with all its relation to ‘power’ and the
ability to conduct such regulation for that matter. Thus, we ought to say that
the idea of ‘sound’ itself is already associated with the matter of power as
“Malinowski (1923, pp. 45 1, 470-81) has made the point that among ‘primitive’
(oral) peoples generally language is a mode of action…” (Ong, 2002: 32).
Even
though we may correlate such preposition with Marx’s conception concerning
materiality—as the term ‘action’ itself is highly associated with ‘physical’ or
‘material’ matters—as it ought to become a different elaboration of a different
matter, we will become the main concern of our attention is its significant
relation to the idea of power. Despite the idea that it may be considered
merely as a form of manifestation, not a somewhat ‘direct’ implementation of
such condition, we ought to perceive the later—in a sense that it comes in a
form of its manifestation—conception of power does contain a kind of
association with the matter of ‘regulation’, and much later, the matter of
‘authority’.
As
one of the examples for the aforementioned manifestation and relation of power
and authority, Ong pointed out that “Oral peoples commonly think of names (one
kind of words) as conveying power over things” (pg. 32). The process of naming
or ‘labeling’ something with ‘words’ or “one kind of words” is considered as an
attempt to convey one’s power over things, and yet if we look at it from a
different perspective, we ought to perceive such attempt as an attempt to
‘influence’ one’s power by giving names over the things that one may see,
comprehend, etc. It ‘influence’ one’s power through a manifestation of his or
her own ‘power’ by giving names over other things. Moreover, from this
condition alone we ought to say that the whole attempt or action to give names
or to label things itself is a manifestation of one’s ‘power’ and ‘authority’
in a way that it both indirectly and directly shows one’s ‘authority’ or
ability to label something in any way that one wants.
Furthermore,
under the topic of ‘exchange’ within the matter of ‘authority’, Ong also
mentioned that “names do give human beings power over what they name” (pg. 33).
It is indeed interesting to see that the whole process of giving names—labeling
‘names’—and being given—or being labelled—names both signifies a degree of
importance towards the idea of power. Thus, we may be able to consider the
process of giving and being given names as an ‘exchange’ of power in a sense
that one gives name, or names, to other as a proof for his or her own ‘power’
to give, or to ‘label’, names to others, and on the other side of the river of
naming exchange, the one that is given a name, or names, as Ong pointed out, is
also being given ‘power’ according to the name, or names that one has—even
though, it is possible for a gap to happen between the human beings, in a form
of a gap concerning the different ‘power’ that one may possess compared to the
others. The act of giving names, or labels, ended up being considered as an
explicit exchange of one’s power, or ‘authority’, with respective being(s).
“Oral memory works effectively
with ‘heavy’ characters, persons whose deeds are monumental, memorable and
commonly public…to organize experience in some sort of permanently memorable
form” (Ong, Walter J., 2002: 68).
As
another example of how close the relation between ‘authority’ and sound is, Ong
yet again pointed out that oral memory, or one could say, a memory about a
sound, or anything ‘orally pronounced’ perhaps, is highly associated with
memorable people.
If
we, again, refer back to the preceding elaboration of ‘authority’, one of its
manifestation is closely related with the idea of influencing people with its
mere existence alone. Yet, if we try to correlation such concept with this
particular condition, we would encounter a similarity in a sense that
one—either it is a person, a thing, etc.—ought to require such degree of
‘power’, ‘authority’—perhaps not it its literal sense—and ‘influence’ to be
able to become a memorable idea inside one’s oral memory, or to put it simple,
one’s memory.
Even
though, I am not able to point out its relation with the aforementioned
‘exchange’ of power within orality, yet, this situation alone signifies, yet
again, the significant relation between power and sound, in a sense that we
could say that we, or one, have to be ‘oral’ if we, or one, want to be
‘memorable’ for other human beings; ‘oral’ in a sense that we have to take
action, or to take ‘physical’ gesture, in order to become ‘memorable’ for
others, that is if one does have the interest to become ‘memorable’ for the
others.
“Because in its
physical constitution as sound, the spoken word proceeds from the human
interior and manifests human beings to one another as conscious interiors, as
persons, the spoken word forms human beings into close-knit groups…a unity”
(Ong, Walter J., 2002: 72).
Within
the preceding paragraphs, we focused our attention solely at the relation
between orality and the idea of becoming ‘memorable’, we will not perceive the
process of how orality, or spoken language, is able to form a group of human
beings, a united human beings.
Again
in its relation with ‘power’ and ‘authority’, orality, or spoken language,
signifies another interesting remark on how it is able to form such group of
human beings. As it is implemented through the connection between one conscious
interiors with one another interiors of other human beings—which will be
relatable with Freud’s or Lacan’s ideas concerning psychoanalysis and such, if
you have the interest upon such matter—this condition alone signifies the
degree of ‘authority’ that orality does possess as it is able to both
‘regulate’ and ‘influence’ other human beings to be formed in a group. It is
simply logical to think that one—orality in this particular case—will have to
possess a quite ‘admirable’ degree of both ‘power’ and ‘authority’ to be able
to successfully form a group of hard-to-control human beings.
Even
though the actual manifestation of constructing such group as a result from the
spoken word seems to be as simple as starting out a conversation with other
people, through speaking of course—as it is indeed spoken and oral language—it
does not scrutinize the idea of how such process, or actualization of forming a
group through spoken language is highly relatable and somehow dependent on the
‘power’ and ‘authority’ that one may possess.
Trap of Authority in “The Mouse
Trap”
As
an attempt to apply the preceding slightly-too-extensive elaboration concerning
the matter of ‘authority’, I believe that I do find correlating situation
within the play entitled “The Mouse Trap” (1902), created by William Dean
Howells. Even though it would be a brief explanation—hopefully—as I ought to
discuss this particular matter, especially this particular play, even further
with another piece of writings.
“Mrs. Somers, sending
her voice after him in a wail of despair: “Willis!” Campbell, coming back:
“Well?” Mrs. Somers: “I can’t let you go.” He runs towards her, but she shrinks
back on her chair against the wall. “No, no!” Campbell, hesitating: “Why did
you call me back, then?” Mrs. Somers: “I—I didn’t call you back; I just
said—Willis”.” (Howells, 1902: 45).
Some
may not be able to perceive the idea of ‘authority’ that lies within these
abrupt quotation of a scene from the play as it is indeed invisible from the
eyes who do not have the specific intention to uncover the issue relating to
the exchange of authority.
Nonetheless,
the kind of authority that we are trying to uncover within the particular scene
is the authority of both a woman and a man.
The
woman’s ‘authority’ in this sense comes in a form of the ability to influence
the other which is a man in this particular case to obey her command. Even
though we could only retrieve a brief example of such matter of command—in a
sense the man’s obligation to answer her calling that is, so as her own
influence to summon the man before her—it is already sufficient to become an
evidence of the existent exchange of authority between the woman and the man.
The
exchange itself comes in a form of a situation where Mrs. Somers shows her own
hesitation in terms of whether she should let Willis go or she should persuade
him to stay. Willis’ presence then becomes a problem as if he did go just like
what Mrs. Somers had told him to do it would diminish the authority that Mrs.
Somers had at that particular moment as she was not going to be able to express
her influence towards the others as the object of her ‘authority’ was not
there—Willis that is.
This
matter of ‘authority’ also influences Willis in his own compassion towards the
concept of being a gentleman. It has become a problem because the existence of
the aforementioned idea solely depends on his ability to obey the request of
his lady as the idea of being gentleman is usually associated with the gesture
of obeying and treating a man’s lady well. Thus, even though it was not
explicitly described through the quotation above, it would be a problem for
Willis if he did not answer Mrs. Somers’ calling—no matter if it’s only a fake
one—because that act of disobedience towards his lady’s calling would diminish
the ‘authority’ that he acquired from being acknowledged as a gentleman.
Yet
again, the exchange of authority between Mrs. Somers and Willis ought to become
more vivid as it is slightly similar with the condition of exchange which has
been elaborated in paragraphs above.
It
comes in a form of a ‘trade’ in a sense that the existence of Mrs. Somers’
authority solely depends on the presence of Willis as the other participant of
the ‘exchange’ itself. Willis’ authority, which he acquired from his quality as
a gentleman, also depends on the presence of Mrs. Somers’ as it is the source
of his own sense of ‘authority’. Thus, it ought to become an interchangeable
exchange of ‘authority’ as one, obviously enough, depends on the existence of
the other—especially relating to the sense of ‘authority’ which was being
exchanged.
As
an addition, relating to Ong’s elaboration and the preceding explanation about
the relation between ‘authority’ and orality, it has been pointed out that the
act of giving and being given names is closely associated with the matter of
‘power’, and all of its manifestation. Similar situation ought to be perceived
in the brief dispute between Mrs. Somers and Willis, especially when Willis
argued about how it is demeaning for him at the time when Mrs. Somers pointed
out that Willis was not a gentleman.
“Mrs. Somers: “And do
you think threatening me is gentlemanly?” Campbell: “That isn’t the question.
Do you think I’m a gentleman?” Mrs. Somers: “You’re what the world calls a gentleman—yes.” Campbell:
“Do you think I am one?” Mrs. Somers:
“How can I tell? I can’t think at all, perched up here.”” (Howells, 1902: 48).
Again,
it has been mentioned before that to give one a name is simply to convey one’s
power over the other, yet the name, or names, itself gives the power to the
respective being that is being named, the power according to the name, or
names, it has been assigned with.
However,
in this particular and distinctive dispute between Mrs. Somers and Willis, the
matter of giving a ‘name’ and being given a ‘name’—or ‘labels’—is in line with
the exchange of ‘authority’ and ‘power’ which has been pointed out in the
preceding paragraphs.
The
condition where the ‘name’ “gentleman” becomes the main concern of their
dispute signifies the idea that in that particular context of the play, Willis
acquired his ‘power’ through the name, or label, “gentleman” which he received
from both the society, and especially from Mrs. Somers as a ‘reward’ from his
gestures towards her. Thus, it is logical for Willis to defend his label of
being a “gentleman”, showed by his attempt to argue Mrs. Somers who despised
his own gentleman-ness, due to his own ‘fear’ to loss all of his ‘authority’
which is given through the name “gentleman” itself. However, this situation
also amplifies both the ‘power’ and the ‘authority’ which Mrs. Somers possesses
in a way that her ‘voice’ in confirming Willis’ label as “gentleman” is
significantly important for Willis, and it is also an implication to the idea
that Mrs. Somers does have significant ‘power’ and ‘authority’ to be able to
convey her ‘power’, and influence, through naming and labeling—merely
justifying in this particular case—the name “gentleman” to Willis.
Nonetheless, after the
slightly-too-elaborate explanation within the preceding paragraphs, it is
indeed interesting to stumble our ways upon the matter of authority, with all
of its intricacies—elaborated through preceding paragraphs—as we ought to
uncover the systematic yet dynamic correlation between this particular issue
with the discourse of colonialism, feminism, social issues, and so on, through
the endless woven fabric of language, and all of its intricacies as well.
However, there are possibilities to bring another relatable matter with this
particular elaboration—like the issue concerning psychological aspects, similar
manifestation in ‘structure’, and so on—as it could act simply as a starting
point for a much further discussion upon the matter.
References:
Belsey, Catherine.1994. “Constructing the
Subject: Deconstructing the Text” in Contemporary
Literary Criticism ed. Con Davis, Robert and Schleifer, Ronald. (1994). New
York and London: Longman Publishing Group.
Cixous,
Héléne. 1981. “Castration or Decapitation” translated by Kuhn, Annette in Signs (Vol. 7, No. 1. Autumn, 1981; pp.
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Foucault, Michel. 1969. “What Is an
Author?” in Critical Theory Since Plato ed. Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy.
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1977. “Truth and Power” in Critical Theory Since Plato ed. Adams,
Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3rd edition; pg. 1269-1279). United
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Howell, William Dean. 1902. The Mouse Trap. New York and London:
Harper & Brothers Publishers. Retrieved from http://www.archive.org/details/mousetrapfarce00howeuolt
(Published in 2007).
Ong, Walter J. 2002. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of
the Word. New York and London: Routledge.
Said, Edward. 1978. “Orientalism” in Critical Theory Since Plato ed. Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3rd
edition; pg. 1370-1383). United States: Wadsworth Publishing.
Williams, Raymond. “Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory”
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