Even
though Bhabha did mentioned that the product of relation between mimesis and
mimicry is a mode to represent something, the “Mimicry” itself “repeats rather than re-presents” (1984: 128). The idea of repeating something, or
manifesting a repetition about something, seems to be a music to our ears if we
do remember similar elaboration being brought by Jacques Derrida in his
preposition concerning structure. In “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse
of the Human Sciences” (1966), Derrida mentioned that:
“And again on the basis
of what we call the center…repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and
permutations are always taken from a history of meaning…” (In Adams and Searle,
2004: 1206)
In this sense, mimicry takes
its object from a history meaning as it does repeat the whole idea of its
respective object from the history of particular meaning that has become the
object of the mimicry itself. This situation is indeed problematic as it allows
the act of mimicry to repeat any relatable object with all of its intricacies,
or in Derrida’s opinion, “that this disruption” in structure “was repetition in
every sense of the word” (2004: 1207), as the mimicry somehow limits the idea
of manipulating language by only repeating it, creating disallowance towards
any kind of play that we could apply towards the language. However, again on
Bhabha’s writings, he mentioned that, as the mimicry is merely to repeat, the
whole idea seems to be “a body politic that refuses to be representative, in a
narrative that refuses to be representational” signifying the opinion that
mimicry refusal towards the idea of representational is simply because of “The
desire to emerge as “authentic” through mimicry”. Mimicry repeats because it
carries its own intention, its own desire to present the “authenticity” of
particular problems, different from the repetition in structure as it only
ignites the disruption within the structurality
of structure itself. Mimicry does repeat solely to create the idea that “is the
final irony of partial representation” (1984: 129); it repeats to present the
ironic authenticity of certain idea within the history of meaning, not only to
merely repeat such idea or problem. And, if we refer back to Bhabha’s opinion
that the writings—as the excess between mimesis and mimicry—is manifested to
"quite simply mocks its power to be a model”, implying that the whole idea
of both mimicry and its excess as writings correlates as we could see that one
of the requirement for such idea to be repeated by mimicry is something that
carries power, “that power which supposedly makes it imitable” (pg. 128). On
the other hand, this does imply that the whole process of repeating and
presenting the ironic authenticity of something is simply to present the irony
and “authenticity” of power which something does carry.
Nonetheless,
both the terms “desire” and “power”—which were clearly in relation to the idea
of mimicry—are problematic in a way that their boundaries are ambiguous,
creating such difficulty in pointing out which problems that can be included as
the problem of desire—whose desire? Where does it come from?—which issues that
can be called a problem of power—what kind of power? Whose power? How does it
being implemented in the idea of mimicry? And so on—leading into a kind of
arbitrary state, which will increase the degree of difficulty, especially in
terms of searching for validity upon the idea of mimicry as a presentation of
an ironic “authenticity” upon something.
Desire
and Power in Mimicry
Again, even though
Bhabha did mention that the idea of doing mimicry as a form of repetition, or
an act of repeating something, is based on “the desire to emerge as “authentic”
through mimicry” (1984: 129), the desire here becomes enigmatic in a way that
it was used for a particular idea of presenting an ironic “authenticity”,
signifying the degree of importance of one to emerge, implying that there is a
carnal-like desire that has established itself to be the core ignition in
creating such excess desire to emerge something, to present something, to
uncover something.
“…he nevertheless
overcomes…the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude in a
slightly leaning forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back
an instantaneous aspect of the image” (Lacan in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004:
442)
Referring
to Lacan’s idea on his writings “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function
of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” (1966), the relation of
desire with one self goes back to the phase of mirror stage, a stage where a
baby finally recognizes his significant other by looking at a mirror. It
started when a baby eventually recognizes the presence of “his own image in a
mirror”, leading to the idea of recognition that “is indicated in the
illuminative mimicry of the Aha-Erlebnis”
which was according to Lacan’s perception on what “Kohler sees as the
expression of situational apperception”, a pinnacle and also important phase
“of the act of intelligence” (2004: 441-2). It does not only signifies the
birth of the act of intelligence in a man, but also the beginning of one’s
perception about certain image as one would eventually overcome any obstruction
that challenged him as long as he is going to be able to hold his own gaze, his
own perception on an image of something. Implying, yet again, the idea that a
man is finally able to grasp, see and experience his first presentation of an
image.
Moreover,
the whole process then leads to the premature conception of “the Ideal-I” as it
will also become “the source of secondary identifications” of the Ideal-I
itself, yet it does situate “the agency of the ego” within its own structure
“which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone” as later a man
“must resolve as I his discordance with his own reality” (2004: 442). This
situation signifies the importance of the mirror stage, yet again, as it
constructs the basic template of an I for a man, alongside the secondary source
of identification which his other, his own image provides, even though it would
put the existence of agent of the ego which will always be relatable to the
presence of individual, and later the emergence of one’s own contradiction with
his own perspective and representation of reality. For an example, as a man
look upon himself towards a mirror, he is now aware of the presence of his own
self—through the image within the mirror—alongside the possibility of using
that image as a secondary source for his own identification, yet he cannot
escape from his own ego as a self, especially when he eventually has to
overcome the contradictions and intricacies of the situation of his own
reality.
The
matter of ego itself becomes interesting as it ought to lead us to the idea of
“What has dominated human history to date” in terms of our motives in doing
something “is the need to labour” (Eagleton, 1983: 151) in a sense that it
refers back to the idea of what Freud has mentioned in his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis “the motive of human
society is in the last resort an economic one” (pg. 151). Further in his
elaboration about “Psychoanalysis” in Literary
Theory: An Introduction (1983), Eagleton reminded us that “for Freud that
harsh necessity”, of having to labour, “means that we must repress some of our
tendencies” (pg. 151) in a sense that we have to eventually put aside our own
tendencies, our own ego in achieving the pleasure that we do desire, in doing
such labour which is important in a way that it is the way for us to survive; as
survival has known to be the one of the reason of our existence and presence,
just like Eagleton’s idea that “If we were not called upon to work in order to
survive”, to work as in to labour, “we might simply lie around all day doing
nothing” (pg. 151). Yet, this continuity of repressing our tendencies lead into
a problem as the “repression may become excessive and make us ill” (pg. 151).
It rots us in a way that it is indeed a repression towards our own tendencies;
the tendencies that we desired. Similar to a constipation in our own bladder system,
even though this one comes in a form of a constipation within our own ego,
desires and tendencies towards something.
As
we move back to the concept of the mirror stage, and especially the idea of
mimicry, it seems to us that both of which carry a relation with the theory of
how one’s tendencies are being repressed as an outcome of being motivated by
such economical values of having able to survive. It is a relation of how the
mirror stage, and eventually the process of mimicry, can be considered as the
excess form from one’s repression, in a way that both seem to provide a way for
one to be finally detached from the repression—yet it does not detach oneself
from the existence and influence of economical values to survive, only to
somehow overcome the repression itself. After going through the mirror stage,
one is now able to be a vague subject in a sense that he is now able to
perceive his own image on his own self, and finally manifest his own
intelligence. Such process implies the situation where one does not require to
be dependent on something else other than himself—his imago—yet he cannot
despise the fact on the importance of his own other, his image.
Then,
in the matter of mimicry; the matter of how “the desire to emerge as
“authentic” through mimicry” (Bhabha, 1984: 129), the matter of the degree of
importance for the idea to emerge, is similar in a way that the whole existence
of desire to emerge implies the idea that one has been repressed with such
vigor that his repression leads to the desire to finally ‘emerge’ out of the
following repression in form of a mimicry. Even though the whole process of
mimicry is based on a repetition which eventually leads into an ironic
“authenticity” of something, this condition alone implies the idea that what did
repress one’s tendencies in such matter comes in a form of power in a sense
that while looking at the situation as Bhabha did mention “power which
supposedly makes it imitable” (1984: 128), signifying the requirement of power
in the idea that is imitable, this whole identification implies that power has
become the main concern in both the cause of one’s repression of his own
tendencies—in the relatable context—and the manifestation of the repression
through the selection of the object of imitation which requires it to carry
certain level of power that determines its degree of imitability.
Skepticality in Mimicry
Referring
back to Bhabha’s further elaboration on mimicry, and its correlation with
discourse in both colonial and perhaps post-colonial issue, he did mention that
“the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence” as later it signifies the idea of how “The authority of
that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore
stricken by an indeterminacy” (1984: 126). Nonetheless, noticing the presence
of both “ambivalence” and “indeterminacy” in its correlation with the whole
concept of mimicry—of course it is based on Bhabha’s perspective concerning
colonial and post-colonial problems—it is intriguing as those two terms
signifies the existence of skepticality—as I like to call it—within the
construction of mimicry itself.
“And first of all, it is
to be noticed that to be a consistent sceptic, a man should be ready to commit
himself to the definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing
as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628)
A.K.
Rogers in his writings entitled “Scepticism” (1904) has elaborated that the
situation of being skeptical, or to be a skeptic, is to put one’s self to a
state-of-mind or perspective where one will not have any sorts of reason to
fully accept “any one thing as true above any other thing”, meaning that one
has to accept the idea that one thing does not carry a higher degree of ‘truth’
compared to any other. The state of being skeptical provides us with the idea
that there is no such concept, theory or thing that is the ‘truest’ of all
concepts, theories, and things, allowing the possibility for the others to be
just as valid as the others.
In
relation to the terms “ambivalence” and “indeterminacy”, while referring to
Rogers’ elaboration on the idea of skepticality, it seems that both “ambivalence”
and “indeterminacy” are the excess of skepticality as “ambivalence” signifies
the existence of contradictions upon an idea, and “indeterminacy” emphasizes
the idea of something being not able to be resolved in a way that it implies
the presence of similar contradictions, resulting in the sense of indeterminacy
of the idea itself. It is a kind of excess as the presence of contradictions in
“ambivalence” and the product of similar contradictory argumentations that is
“indeterminacy” both can be considered a manifestation of the idea that
constructs the whole theory of skepticality, that is the condition where “he
has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (1904:
628), or the situation that one ought to find the slightest contradictions in
things as to equalize the degree of validity in each and every ideas, concepts,
or even theories—referring back to the opinion that there is not a thing that
is the ‘truest’ thing as it is compared with the others.
Later
in Lacan’s writings, “The Line and Light” in The Four Fundamental Concept of Psychoanalysis (1998), his
elaboration concerning mimicry—which Bhabha did quote on the beginning of his
writings—does signify the problem which the term carries. Lacan explained that
“mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from might be called an itself” (1998: 99), implying the idea
that the whole process of mimicry presents something that is significantly
distinguishable with the “itself” of the particular something. Yet, this idea
somehow contradicts with Bhabha’s elaboration on how mimicry simply repeats but
not re-present as its repetition has something to do with the desire—which I
have explained about in the preceding paragraphs. Nonetheless, the enigmatic
issue in mimicry leads to the idea, as Lacan has explained, “whenever we are
dealing with imitation” relating to the idea of constructing a mimicry—or even
the product mimicry itself—“we should be very careful not to think too quickly
of the other who is being imitated” (1998: 100) as this explanation alone
implies the idea of how we should consider the presence of
contradictions—relating to the idea of skepticality—that imitation—as a
manifestation of mimicry—carry. However, Lacan also pointed out that “To
imitate is no doubt to reproduce an image”, even though it situates another
problem on whether to reproduce means to repeat or to re-present, yet he also
perceived “But at bottom, it is, for the subject, to be inserted in a function
whose exercises grasps it” (pg. 100), implying the idea that the process of
imitation is simply a process of putting the subject within the method which is
able to “grasp” it, to hold it, to control it.
Even
though at first Lacan’s idea of imitation signifies the idea to “reproduce” an
image, creating another problem whether it is in correlation with the process
of repeating or re-presenting the image, at its core construction, the concept
of imitation is a process of simply putting a subject within a method that is
able to gain control over it in a sense that it is able to barely reach similar
sense with the subject even though it is still distinguishable with the
“itself” of the subject. It is merely the matter of how, as it significant
concerns towards the method, rather than the whole idea of fully imitating the
subject or the object of imitation itself.
Writings as an Excess of Mimicry
Despite
the fact that I have elaborated some of my own ideas on Bhabha’s problematic
concept of how writings has become the excess between mimesis and mimicry at
the very beginning of this particular writings, that does not imply that I have
forgotten about this respective issue as it has become, somehow, the foundation
of my own enquiries regarding the whole construction of mimicry itself.
“What emerges between
mimesis and mimicry is a writing, a
mode of representation, that marginalizes the monumentality of history, quite
simply mocks its power to be a model, the power which supposedly makes it
imitable” (1984: 128)
After
we have recognized that the individual concept of mimicry is simply to repeats,
as Bhabha has explained, it is indeed intriguing that the excess of such act of
repetition and the elements of mimesis comes in a form of representation, a
writing. However, if we look back at Lacan’s opinon on how “to imitate is no
doubt to reproduce an image” (1998: 100), while putting the existence of the
term mimesis and mimicry into our account, it seems that the whole idea of
writing as an excess of both mimesis and mimicry as a mode of representation correlates
with the idea of how to imitate is simply to reproduce. The correlation is
constructed in a sense that the excess of mimesis and mimicry comes in an idea
of representation, while the concept of imitation, or to imitate, comes in an
idea of reproduction. This whole situation somehow situates a perception that writings
is a product of both the relation between mimesis and mimicry, yet also the
manifestation of the whole process of imitation. An excess which later “mocks
its power to be a model, the power which supposedly makes it imitable” (1984:
128) while inserting a subject within a function which method controls it—as it
is referred to Lacan’s further elaboration about the matter of imitation.
Furthermore,
the writing is also a manifestation of the desire to “emerge” alongside its own
intricacies with power, and constructed upon ambivalence while facing the
condition of indeterminacy as a result from carrying certain elements of
mimicry. However, this situation alone—the situation of coming in a form of
writing, or discourse—imbues a relation with the complexity of language, as it
is obvious that a writing will eventually relate to the whole system and
structure of language.
If
we refer back to Lacan’s explanation about the mirror stage, a stage where one
finally able to grasp his own possibility to become a subject—of some
sort—detaching himself from a kind of dependency towards his own imago, as
later the similar idea of subject being brought to an explanation as it was now
facing the concept of imitation, the concept of how it is “to be inserted in a
function whose exercise grasps it” (1998: 100), it is indeed intriguing to see
that there is a significant role of the subject in terms of its correlation
with the complex idea of imitation, and later mimesis and mimicry, especially
as its own ego comes into the play as it “will always remain irreducible for
the individual alone” as later a man “must resolve as I his discordance with
his own reality” (2004: 442).
As
we are now talking about how the excess of mimesis and mimicry, alongside the
idea of imitation, comes in a form of a writing, the significance of subject
still persist as according to Catherine Belsey, in her writings “Constructing the Subject:
Deconstructing the Text” (1994), “the subject is constructed in language and in
discourse” signifying the idea that as long as it comes in form of language,
even in its manifestation as writings in relation to the matter of mimicry, the
existence of subject is acceptable, yet it will always be considered as a
matter of ideology “since the symbolic order in its discursive use is closely
related to ideology, in ideology (1994: 358). This situation implies not only
the persistence of subject but also the ideological value that it carries.
Knowing that there is a possibility for such
ideological value to exist through the presence and interference of subject in
the matter of mimesis, mimicry, and the whole process of imitation, we could
assume that the whole intricacies regarding the desire, power, and the slightest
value of skepticality regarding the entire construction of mimicry, with all of
its correlating elements, are based by the influence and presence of such
ideological ideas. Its foundation is constructed by ideological ideas in a
sense that it is a manifestation of the carnal-like motivation to simply
express or vent out his own perception and ideas about something.
In terms of how mimicry is a manifestation of
the desire to emerge, relating to the preceding idea of the existence of such
ideological influence, the whole idea of constructing a mimicry is simply an
exhaustion of constantly being repressed in by such ‘power’ in correlation with
Bhabha’s main concern in the realm of both colonialism, and perhaps
post-colonialism, resulting in the emergence of the desire to finally ‘emerge’
from all of the repression coming in a form of mimicry, in a form of ironic repetition
of the ‘authenticity” upon particular ideas. This condition alone implies that
the whole effort of creating a mimicry about something is ideological and
political in a way that it has become a way to vent out the repression while at
the same time showing one’s critical—and somehow skeptical—perspective towards
something as the repetition which is the product of the mimicry is simply an
expression of one idea about something while the ironic elements that it
carries signifies the critical perspective that one could carry as it is an
attempt to point out the contradictions and intricacies within the matter that
was being mimicked or simply discussed. It is indeed both ideological and
political in a way that by doing such repetition or pointing out the
contradiction and ambivalence in the respective matter as it will eventually
become the matter of increasing, recreating, constructing and emerging power in
terms of one’s idea about something that is—as it is ideological.
One of the relatable reason why Bhabha
applied such approach, concerning mimicry, towards the whole problems and
intricacies of colonial discourses as it generally talks about the
contradictions of the power between the colonizer and the colonized, hence the
whole construction of ironic “authenticity” by mimicry regarding such matter.
Skeptical
Ambivalence of Mimicry in the Backward
Place
To become an example towards the construction
of mimicry is simply a recollection of ambivalences, situating certain degree
of skepticality as it does present the contradiction upon certain idea, not to
mention the matter concerning its ideological and political motivation, Ruth
Prawer Jhabvala’s novel entitled the
Backward Place (2005) carries several significant evidence and case of how
ambivalent mimicry is, especially under the discussion of colonialism and
post-colonialism.
The part that I would like to highlight
regarding this particular matter starts when “Dr and Mrs Hochstadt had just
come back from the world première of Ibsen’s Doll’s House in Hindi” (2005: 188), as from this sentence alone we
could sense the significance of the event itself as it is “the world première”
of a popular European play to be presented in Hindi, a language of the
third-world country, India; this situation alone is indeed problematic as we
could also perceive a form of mimicry is being presented through the idea of
using Hindi, the language of Eastern culture, in a play which is taken from
European, or Western culture.
Things get even more intriguing as we are now
presented a kind of feedback towards the play from the Hochstadts, which is one
of the representatives from the culture of the West, as “of course, fair as
always, they had to admit that they didn’t know the language” resulting the
situation where “and so probably missed a lot of very fine nuances”. This
condition signifies the idea that even though the Eastern have tried to
construct a mimicry upon using Hindi in presenting the play from European or
Western culture, one of the result that they achieve is the fact that “they” as
it refers to the Hochstadts, the Western culture itself, “didn’t know the
language”, resulting a situation where some part of the play being not fully
comprehended by certain amount of its audience, especially the Western audience
like the Hochstadts. This whole intricacies also implies the idea that effort
of mimicry that had been done by the Indian is simply ironic as it does not
really achieve its core intention as “they could not help feeling that the
production as a whole lacked that certain élan which makes for a really
satisfying evening at the theatre” (2005: 188), emphasizing the idea that their
effort of mimicry towards the Western culture is not that effective in terms of
influencing the perspective of the Western people towards them, towards the
culture of the Eastern.
Even when “Captain Lakhsman, as Torvald
Helmer”, one of the character in the play, “had delivered all his lines with
his right hand rasied in the air: which might, the Hotchstadts didn’t know” as
such gesture is “an Indian dramatic convention” signifying another effort in
presenting the form of mimicry—doing such Indian style of dramatic convention
in the so called reenactment of Doll’s
House in Hindi—yet it also lead to the situation where “but they”, the
Hotchstadts, “rather felt it made…for a certain stiffness” (2005: 188),
magnifying, yet again, the lack of significance upon the Eastern flavor that
was trying to be implemented in doing the whole play, not making any influence
to the Western perspective as it is merely considered as “a certain stiffness”,
a certain lack in presenting the play.
Nonetheless, the whole intention and
actualization of playing Ibsen’s Doll
House in Hindi as an act of mimicry from the Eastern culture towards the
Western leads to an abundant amount of irony as in the end, what was concerned
as an important idea of the whole intricacies is “but what a store-house of
memories they would be taking with them!”, the Hotchstadts yet again, “How
greatly they felt themselves enriched by their contact with this fabled land!”
(2005: 189). The whole situation leads to ideas of skeptical contradictions as
on one part of the perspectives, the Eastern representatives were simply trying
to merge their own culture by using their Hindi language in presenting Ibsen’s Doll’s House, with the intention that
they could mimic the play, while somehow create a new impression towards the
Western representatives, which one of its roles is taken by the Hotchstadts,
yet the whole idea only leads to the irony that it is considered as lacking in
a way that the play was acted out. One the other hand, from the Western
perspective, from the Hotchstadts’ perspective, the only thing that mattered to
them is the idea that they have seen and experienced the attempt to mimic their
own culture, by playing one of the famous play in their culture, while using
Hindi, that eventually has nothing to do with their own perspective and opinion
towards the Eastern culture. It merely becomes an object of their own mockery,
or criticism, as the only thing that the Hotchstadts could see in the play was
its flaws or errors. It eventually becomes a mere addition for their own
experience of establishing such contact with the “fabled land!” of the Eastern
culture.
To put this intriguing occurrences in another
way, we could also uncover the contradiction relating to the idea of power and
desire within the following issues. The idea of finally deciding to present a
Hindi version of a western drama signifies the existence of the desire that the
Eastern representatives carry; the desire to finally emerge from their own
repression by mimicking the Western culture as they use Hindi in acting out one
of the plays from the Western culture. However, such attempt somehow has no
significant influence for the Western representatives itself as the whole idea
of acting out the play in Hindi leads to such an irony, as it merely becomes a
‘fresh’ object of critical opinion, as it is considered to be lacking in
several of its elements. An irony in a
way that the whole play was trying to be “authentic” in a way that it used
Hindi language, it used Indian people as the actors and actresses, yet it only
adds to its exoticness within the perspective of the Western, the perspective
of the Hotchstadts. Nonetheless, this whole situation merely signifies the
persistence of the power that Western culture carry as it does possess such
influence in making the Eastern representatives wanted to make such act of
mimicry, yet we could not ignore the idea that its presence, the presence of
the so called Western power, has become the witness for the Eastern culture to
matter—even though it was perceived in such way—implying the idea that it is merely a problem of ideological and
political matter in terms of the presence of each perspectives.
Work Cited:
Belsey, Catherine.1994. “Constructing the Subject: Deconstructing
the Text” in Contemporary Literary Criticism ed. Con Davis, Robert and Schleifer, Ronald.
(1994). New York and London: Longman Publishing Group.
Bhabha,
Homi. 1984. “Of Mimicry and Men: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse” in October, Vol. 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring,
1984; pp.125-133). The MIT Press retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/778467
Derrida, Jacques. 1966. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of
the Human Sciences” in Critical Theory
Since Plato ed. Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3rd
edition; pg. 1206-1215). United States: Wadsworth Publishing.
Eagleton,
Terry. 1983. Literary Theory: An
Introduction. England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited.
Freud,
Sigmund from “Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis” in Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction (1983, pg. 151).
England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited.
Jhabvala,
Ruth Prawer. 2005. The Backward Place.
Great Britain: John Murray (Publishers)
Lacan,
Jacques. 1966. “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience” in Literary Theory: An
Anthology ed. Rivkin, Julie and Ryan, Michael (2004, 2nd edition; pg. 441-6).
United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing.
1998.
“The Line and Light” in the Four
Fundamental Concept of Psychoanalysis ed. Miller, Jacques-Alain trans.
Sheridan, Alan (Book XI). New York, United States and London, England: W. W.
Norton & Company.
Rogers, A. K. 1904. “Scepticism” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 13 No. 6.
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[1] Language and Literary Studies: Skeptically Political (2014); http://twosidesofmoon.blogspot.com/2014/09/w-n-yan-ramadhan-180410110063-response.html#more
[2] Also Language and Literary Studies: Skeptically Political (2014); http://twosidesofmoon.blogspot.com/2014/09/w-n-yan-ramadhan-180410110063-response.html#more
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