Response 1 (Draft 3): Language and Literary Studies: Skeptically Political

 “The bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary” (Saussure in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 62).

Saussure’s idea about how language unit is “a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms” (2004: 61) has become the pinnacle for the analysis, further approaches and studying towards language as it provides huge amount of both space and possibilities for one to uncover the arbitrariness that language carries. Even though, it is still difficult to comprehend its arbitrariness as the language system which is the seemingly most obvious apparatus to be exploited in dissecting and analyzing the arbitrariness is also arbitrary. Yet this situation alone increases the level of intricacies that the language has; despite the irony that could be implied from the following condition, it widens the possibility for an analysis to be conducted as language is unrestrained from a bound that its own form provides. A symptom on the idea that the arbitrariness of language has become one of the elements in an attempt deconstructing the structure of a language as its allow such amount of flexibility for one to relate any matter under the veil of language as long as it carries some level of ‘likeness’, contextual correlation, and any degree or type of connection between respective issues; I assume, it is possible to do so as the word ‘arbitrary’ itself refers to the idea of unspecified issue or value, creating a chance for it to be specified towards particular ideas of problems under the framework of language.   

Putting those preceding ideas in mind, it is intriguing to make an attempt in finding and correlating something which is as arbitrary as language into something just as arbitrary in a sense that it possesses similar degree of ‘contradictions’ and ‘unspecified-ness’ elements. And that’s when, the whole idea—or issues—about skepticism, skeptical mind-frame, or skepticality comes to mind.   

 Skepticality in Structure

If we put a discussion about the term ‘skepticism’—or the state of being ‘skeptical’, a ‘skeptic’—many people will only correlate it towards the idea of not being able to choose between several options, questioning too much about certain things, etc.; implying the idea that being skeptical is always related to the notion of how one despises so many ideas, finding flaws in each of those ideas, and so on—where most of those opinions are the negative ones—Even though, some of which are acceptable, the term skepticism or being skeptical does not always imply that that particular person is not able or not willing to recognize and appreciate the validity or even the mere existence of certain proposition; it is the other way around. 

“The Greek word skepsis means enquiry or investigation. But a sceptic is not merely who investigates...Sceptical investigation is distinctively shaped by the possibility of deception and error” (Thorsrud, 2009: 1).

Tracing back to its roots, generally speaking, the word skeptic—or sceptic in its archaic form—is a state of having enquiries about certain issues or a will to investigate something even deeper than before. This condition implies that the seemingly indecisive behavior of a skeptic is not merely caused by the reason that he/ she was not willing to agree on a particular opinion—even though the term ‘to agree’ seems too strong for me as it enclose the possibility of further argumentation—but by the existence of unresolved explanation, resulting further questioning and enquiries, thus preventing themselves to fully accept or agree on one opinion. By being in doubt of their own thoughts, does not simply imply that they’re not doing anything about it as their own enquiries are the results of their skepticality—being skeptical.

“And first of all, it is to be noticed that to be a consistent sceptic, a man should be ready to commit himself to the definite position that he has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628).

A.K. Rogers in his writings entitled “Scepticism” (1904) has said that the idea of being skeptical, or to be a skeptic, is to put one’s self to a state-of-mind where one will not have any sorts of reason to fully accept “any one thing as true above any other thing”, meaning that one has to accept the idea that one thing does not possess a higher degree of ‘truth’ compared to any other. A situation which somehow implies the idea that there is no such thing as the ‘truest’ thing, creating a kind of possibility for many other things to be as valid—in terms of its acceptability when it is being used to support a preposition—in terms of its degree of ‘truth’. To put it in general explanation, we could say that this idea of being skeptical gives us a wide range of possibilities as it considers all thing to be equally valid, which is highly important if say we are going to analyze or perhaps to uncover something as it provides us an abundant amount of point of view to be used in doing such act.

Then, if we are to relate the following conditions and situations of being skeptical with a language-related issue, Jacques Derrida will have a lot of things to show, especially when it is related with his well-known idea on Deconstruction, or some may say Post-Structuralism.

“…up to the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure—or rather the structurality of structure—although it has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence, fixed origin” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1206).

As it has been mentioned before in Thorsrud’s explanation about the term skeptical—or skepsis, the idea of being skeptical is related to an urge or an act of investigation which is constructed by discovering the possibility of mistakes or incompatible explanation about something. In his writing “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1966), Derrida has shown the elaboration of his own further enquiries and investigation towards Saussure’s concept about structure as he seems to be skeptical on how the idea and the term structure is made and used. Even though Derrida is aware the idea of creating a center and the existence of a center within the structure, rather than accepting those following situations, he was questioning the condition of the structurality itself as he enquired about how it “has always been neutralized or reduced” by “a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence” which seems to be ironic as the idea of constructing a center, in hoping to ‘organize’ its structurality, ended up decreasing its own value as the center somehow prohibits its own structure from anything but its own, just like what Derrida has said that “the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the play of the structure” (2004: 1206). It is indeed intriguing if we are talking about “the play of the structure” as the idea somehow implies that the structurality of the structure prevented itself to tamper around with its own structurality which is also limiting the idea of developing and enhancing as it somehow forbids external interference towards the construction of its structurality. In a way, this condition also implies that we could not be skeptical when we are discussing about such matter—the matter of structure—which is somehow difficult as the basic idea of being skeptical, the idea of being curious to investigate something further, is one of the nature of human being. Even though there will be some who only embrace his own curiosity without doing anything about it, still the concept of center in structure will become a hurdle for those who are willing to decipher or ‘tamper’—as a result of one’s curiosity—with the structurality of structure itself.

“Formalist find ambiguity and irony; deconstructors find contradiction and undecidability…post-structuralists celebrate the apparently limitless possibilities for the production of meaning that come about when the language of the critic enters the language of the text” (Miller, 1989: 204-5)

Derrida’s idea on deconstruction has led many deconstructors to utilize his concept of deconstructing in deciphering, analyzing, or simply discussing any matter related to the language—as the concept of deconstruction begins with Derrida’s enquiries towards Saussure’s idea about structure of language, or linguistic unit. As the process of deconstruction requires one to defamiliarize and to deconstruct an idea within language, especially in form of a text or literary text, as … said that “both the formalist and the deconstructor focus on the literary text” (1989: 204) one ought to discover the “contradiction” and “undecidability” within the text which will become their main concern of the text. If we are to correlate this situation and mind-frame back to the idea of skepticality, the term “contradiction” and “undecidability” seem to be in a relation with the term “deception” and “error” which Thorsrud has explained both as the elements of skeptical investigation. A deception can be considered as an idea which cause us to be led into something that is not valid—as it may possesses arguable degree of its sense of argumentation and so on—and an error carries similar attributes with a deception as it is also something that possesses an arguable value in its conduct and its own argumentation. In a way, both “deception” and “error” seem to be a part of “contradiction” as the arguable or doubtful value that both terms possess will eventually lead into a matter of contradiction as those arguable and doubtful value may contradict with another idea under the same concept or certain relevance with any other matter. To some degree, those contradictions may possess some probabilities to influence the sense of ‘undecidability’ on the respective matter or problem as it doubts one’s perception about something by the existence of both deception and error that contradicts with one previous awareness or understanding about similar matter. From this situation alone we could assume that the idea of “contradiction” and “undecidability”, which are the issues that a deconstructor tries to discover in a text, carry an essence of both the terms “deception” and “error” which are the crucial elements in the skeptical investigation. Thus, it is possible for us to assume that there is a kind of interchangeable correlation between those terms as one seems to contribute a portion of its core idea to the other.

Skepticality in Criticism

“The object of criticism is very different; the object of criticism is not “the world” but a discourse, the discourse of someone else: criticism is discourse upon a discourse; it is a second language, or a meta-language (as the logicians would say), which operates on a first language (or language object)” (Barthes, 1964: 48).  

According to Barthes’ explanation in his writings “What Is Criticism?” (1964), it would be difficult for us to differ or to separate criticism with language as it has become the second language upon the basis structure of language itself. It comes in a form of discourse that discuss about another discourse. Such situation is indeed possible if we think back to the issues and intricacies that Derrida pointed out upon Saussure’s idea of structure; especially the structure of linguistic unit—which obviously correlate with the existence of discourse and all of the language related matter—as it has become the pinnacle of an act of criticism showed by Derrida through his elaboration and argumentation, written in a form of his own discourse, about the frailty of Saussure’s concept on structure of the language—as it comes in a form of discourse, Saussure’s discourse about the structure of the language. This situation also implies the idea that to be critical is to have a further discussion about a topic being argued about within a discourse, especially a discourse which was made by another people—along with its own relevance and contradictions.

“For if criticism is only a metalanguage, this means that its task is not at all to discover “truth”, but only “validities”…It is by acknowledging itself as no more than a language (or more precisely, a meta-language) that criticism can be—paradoxically but authentically—both objective and subjective, historical and existential, totalitarian and liberal” (Barthes, 1964: 48-9).

The critical act of writing a criticism comes from the idea of uncovering values of validities that the language, the text, or the discourse carry within itself. Some may say that the act of criticism is merely to find the ‘truth’ that lies beneath its object of analysis, yet it would be very difficult of one insists to find the ‘truth’ within a language, text or a discourse as the language itself is arbitrary, meaning that there will be multiple existence of ‘truth’ within a language which depends on one’s perspective towards the language itself. If we put this situation within the perspective of a skeptical mind, it seems to contradict the idea that all things is fairly valid and there is no such thing as the ‘truest’ idea or concept. The idea of criticism is simply to discover the validities—some of which are hidden, some are bluntly elaborated—that lay within a text, language or a discourse. This idea alone somehow correlates with the commitment to the idea that one “has no reason to accept any one thing as true above any other thing” (Rogers, 1904: 628) which is the fundamental concept of skeptical perspective as it defies the possibility for a ‘truest’ thing to exists, allowing every single thing to carry a degree of validity in its possession. In its condition of being nothing more than a language—being a meta-language—criticism carries the possibility to be objective yet subjective, both historical and existential, totalitarian and liberal which also implies the vast range that it covers, emphasizing the idea that every single thing, with each of its contradiction or even correlation with one another, is indeed valid to be considered as supportive and argumentative references in doing the act of criticism itself—or even to simply discuss something in particular.

Even though, such vastness of topic and ideas to be discussed may become confusing for several people, we ought to remember the idea that a skeptical investigation is fairly based on our founding upon deception and error which will be possible to be discovered as a result from the abundant ideas that may correlate and even contradict with one another. This is one of the example of the advantages that we could acquire by being skeptical as it will uncover our repressed enquiries, questions, doubts, and uncertainty, with which we can dig deeper into each discourses, decreasing the odds for us to be misguided by the myth, general idea, and so on about any matter related to our own interests. Yet, as a product of skepticality, there is a possibility for us to be skeptical even against the whole process and product of criticism itself. It is indeed ironic yet the continuity of skepticality is inevitable as to be curious is one of human’s characteristic—one that differs one from another is the willingness to elaborate his or her curiosity. Coming back to the idea that curiosity is one of human’s behavior, and the cycle of skepticality that will always accompany our way of thinking—as long as we are able to exploit it properly, as long as we are aware that we can use our own doubt to enrich our own knowledge—it seems to be valid that the sense of skepticality, of being skeptical is the reason, or perhaps one of the necessary element for us to keep on criticizing, to improve our range of knowledge on studies in respective matters like language, text, discourse, or even literature.

Skepticality in Discourses about Representation

The term ‘representation’ has become the cult for many people who indulged themselves inside the realm of literary studies where some have used the approach properly, and some have been lost while finding the appropriate way to apply such method in analyzing their respective object of study. No one is at fault in struggling to properly apply the problematic cult of representation, as it seems to be so arbitrary, providing ways for the people to analyze even a single misuse of punctuation or an error in subject and object placement of sentence within a work of literature, as long as they consider those issues as an viable references for them to write a simple essay—with distinctive reasons that each of person has in doing so. In a way, the whole idea of writing about any kind of representation/s is simply based by one’s distinctive enquiries or skepticality—degree of being in doubt or uncertain about something—leading to the process of finding intriguing, eye-catching and mind-catching issues followed up by actually discussing those problems and arranging them into a simple writing.

“And by scepticism I shall mean here that some- what unsystematic attitude whose ground is to be found primarily in an appeal to the fact of error, and a challenge to point out the marks by which we might recognize truth if we once were to stumble on it” (Rogers, 1904: 627).

Such condition emphasize the degree of arbitrariness implemented within the discussion on representation as according to A. K. Rogers, the emergence of issues that lead into the construction of discussion about representation, similar to the act of criticism, is based on the idea of finding “the fact of error” and to uncover “the marks by which we might recognize truth”. Even though, it is still questionable if “we might recognize truth” as the concept of ‘truth’ itself is indeed problematic, yet Rogers put an interesting sentence after those remarks, saying that “we might recognize truth if we once were to stumble on it” as it comes in a form of a conditional sentence and also with the selection of the word ‘stumble’ implying the idea of recognizing the truth is simply coincidental or even accidental. Moreover, the type of error or contradiction which is usually being elaborated within the discourse concerning issues of representation is always related with the thing that is seemingly represented inside a work of literature, essay, or any type of discourse. It does not concern with the degree of ‘truth’ which a representation in a literature, essay or discourse signifies and carries—about particular idea, thing, or issue—but it emphasizes on the process of questioning the degree of ‘validity’ within a representation which was implied and constructed inside works of literature, essays or discourses. These condition magnifies the defying of ‘truth’ and the acceptance of possibility in the equality of validity within every single product of language—especially literature, essay, and critical discourses.

“It should not be possible to read nineteenth-century British literature without remembering that imperialism, understood as England’s social mission, was a crucial part of the cultural representation of England to the English” (Spivak in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 838).

As we take Spivak’s elaboration in her writings “Three Women’s Text and a Critique of Imperialism” to be an example, what we could imply from her idea about how nineteenth-century British literature is simply a part of the cultural representation of England is an evidence showing the condition where Spivak is simply questioning how the validity and the value in the nineteenth-century British literature is merely a representation of the cultural values of England. Her writings is mainly constructed by the elaboration every single contradictions of representations which were shown within the nineteenth-century British literature, like in “Jane Eyre” (1847) where the problems regarding women’s psychological are represented through “Jane’s self-marginalized uniqueness” (2004: 840) which eventually leads to the presupposition of how “the progress of Jane Eyre can be charted through a sequential of the family/ counter-family dyad” (2004: 841). Implying that any mental related ideas that Jane did carry will leads to the binary conception of a family and counter-family, which later becomes the problem on how one type of family is being represented through the presence, existence, or even action of the characters within the story. Moreover, in Mary Shelley’s “Frankenstein” (1818), the main concern of the representation elaborated through its sentences is a dispute where “Frankenstein’s apparent antagonist is God himself as Maker of Man, but his real competitor is also woman as the maker of children” (2004: 847). Using those elaborations of contradictions, Spivak was able to point out her ideas of how several elements included in particular literature correlate with the concept of imperialism, which is one of England’s social objectives, thus signifying the idea that the whole situation is only a part of the cultural representation of England. 

Ideological value of Language and Literature

We now have established the slightest existence of skepticality within the structure of language, its form of criticism, and even at the discourse about representation. Its idea refers back to the concept of the arbitrariness that the language system carries as it signifies the condition of unspecified issue or value, which implies the possibility for such matter to be driven towards specific enquiries or discussion. Thus, this situation alone uncover the question about “what specific issue or idea that this arbitrariness of language being driven to?”, even though there is also a possibility that some may only be done without any logical or relevant reason at all. Yet, this is what makes such enquiry interesting as it signifies the idea that the skeptical approach towards the arbitrariness of language may lead into the uncovering of validities in each manipulation that has been done towards the language system itself as we are indeed looking for the contradiction, misconception and any kind of slightest relevance within the following product of language manipulation—or perhaps exploitation.

 “…language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique. Now this critique may be undertaken along two paths…Once the limit of the nature/ culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systemically and rigorously the history of these concepts. This is a first action. Such a systematic and historic questioning would be neither a philological nor a philosophical action in the classic sense of these words” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1209)

The whole idea of doing such critical approach—creating a criticism—towards every product of language, especially texts, essays, discourses, and so on, according to Derrida’s explanation, is indeed a necessity as it has become a ‘burden’ for the language itself. This situation somehow implies a relation between the necessities of the critiques with the appeal to investigate the particular matters relating to the language itself in correlation with the concept of skepticality as it has been mentioned before. Even though, there is a degree of arbitrariness if we are to talk about such necessities in investigating such matter, we are still able to signify the idea that it may be caused by a skeptical ideology of the critiques as the idea of being skeptical itself is related to the sense of curiosity and the appeal to uncover the error and contradiction within the language in an effort to discover the validities of the particular matter. It is merely a contradiction and irrelevance between the ideas which a critique may carry with the presentation of similar or perhaps correlation concepts being elaborated upon a text, essay, discourse, or even literature.

One of the way that a critique may choose in fulfilling the necessities is “to question systemically and rigorously the history of these concepts”, capitalizing the matter of spatial and temporal occurrences that precedes the process of creating of the particular concepts. This idea somehow signifies the importance of historical relevance and correlation that lies beneath the object of our analysis. Yet this situation also implies the possibility of, again, another relation with the arbitrariness of the language; even though, it is not exactly a value of arbitrariness, but more of subjectivity in finding the relevance between the concept as the object of analysis with its own historical references. It is subjective in a way that it comes back to the ideological preferences that a critique may carry as it will become his own basic qualification on whether a single references on the history of his object of analysis is relevant to his own analysis by doing skeptical enquiries that may also lead him to the validity of the following references.

“The other choice…consists in conservating all these old concepts within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits, treating them as tools which can still be used” (Derrida in Adams and Searle, 2004: 1209).

Another path which can be chosen by the critiques is to conserve the concepts of the past by acknowledging them as a tool to be used for their object analysis while tampering with its limit of relevance and correlation. However, this situation signifies the value of subjectivity and ideological relevancies of the critiques yet again as the idea of “treating them as tool” will be committed with the aid of their own preferences by discovering the relevant and correlating ideas from the concepts from the past with their own current object of criticism. And after going through such process of subjective and ideological selection, the whole process also implies the idea of the tampering upon the concepts of the past as the critiques were “here and there denouncing their limits” by referring to their own, yet again, basic qualification and requirements upon its own relevancies and contradiction.

“Subjectivity, then, is linguistically and discursively constructed and displaced across the range of discourse in which the concrete individual participates…The subject is constructed in language and in discourse and, since the symbolic order in its discursive use is closely related to ideology, in ideology” (Belsey, 1994: 358).

 As the value of subjectivity, in terms of its interferences within the approaches which were used by critiques to overcome their necessities to analyze the bearing language, has become an issue, according to Catherine Belsey in “Constructing the Subject: Deconstructing the Text” (1994), the sense of subjectivity itself has already been a problem as it was “linguistically and discursively constructed” and perhaps implemented  throughout the “range of discourse” and within those discourses “the concrete individual participates”. Belsey’s idea concerning subjectivity signifies an argumentation that the value of one’s subjectivity is indeed exist—and perhaps obviously significant—within the construction of discourse which is clearly both the subject and the object of analysis of the critiques. Those following existence of subjectivity constructed within language and discourse correlate with the idea of ideology “since the symbolic order in its discursive is closely related to ideology”. Thus signifying the idea, as Belsey has stated, that “Ideology suppresses the role of language in the construction of the subject” and as the result of the suppression of ideology within language “people “recognize” (misrecognize) themselves in the ways in which ideology “interpellates” them…” (1994: 358). This idea also implies that the value and elements being elaborated within language and discourse is simply ideological. Hence, the concept of arbitrariness that language carries within its own structure and attributes is similarly ideological in a way that the significant presence of subjectivity within language and discourse has the control to conduct the arbitrariness inside them.

“…a public that attempts to do without criticism, and asserts that it knows what it likes, brutalizes the arts. Rejection of criticism…is involved in all forms of censorship…Most of Shakespeare’s current popularity is due to critical publicity” (Frye in Robert and Schleifer, 1986: 35)   

Following Derrida’s idea about the relation between language and criticism, which is simply a relation of the need to be criticized which the language itself carries, Northrop Frye, in his “Function of Criticism at the Present Time” (1986), pointed out that critical discourses are solely related with the public in a way that criticism is simply “the pioneer of education and the shaper of cultural tradition” (1986: 35). Frye’s idea about the relation between criticism and the public is indeed intriguing as the correlation signifies the dependency of the public towards the existence of criticism. Furthermore, this condition also implies the importance of ideological value that criticism carries as it becomes important in increasing the awareness of the public towards arts, and even towards education and cultural tradition. In addition, the ideological value of criticism is being emphasized yet again as it becomes a supporting-pillar for the popularity of certain arts as Frye pointed out that “Most of Shakespeare’s current popularity is due to critical publicity”. Later in his writings, Frye did mention “Why does criticism have to exist? The best and shortest answer is that it can talk, and all the arts are dumb” (1986: 35), this statement of his, yet again, magnifies the importance of ideological value which is implemented within critical discourses as the hypothesis of how criticism can ‘talk’ signifies the idea that criticism does possess ideological value and ability as it is able to ‘talk’ about the ‘dumb arts’—dumb in a way that the public does not have any knowledge or awareness in how to properly read, embrace, and appreciate the arts itself. Yet, this situation also implicates in a form of another problematic remarks on the possibility of arbitrariness in using the ideological value located within criticism as there will be a chance for the criticism to be manipulated in presenting topics and ideas that are irrelevant with arts, or perhaps it would be exploited to present the ideological yet subjective ideas of the critique, as we refer back to Belsey’s and Derrida’s elaboration on such matter.

“While each individual delegate of the people merely represents this or that party, this or that city, this or that outpost, or even just the necessity of electing any old seven hundred and fifty where neither the man nor the matter is closely examined…” (Marx in Cowling and Martin, 2002: 38). 

The existence of ideological value does not only discoverable in the basic form of language, criticism, or general discourses, but only within the discourse concerning representation, especially the representation in works of literature. Looking at the explanation from Karl Marx’s “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” (1852), the main concern of his writing is mainly to present an argumentation of correlation and contradiction about representation as it uses people’s representation in the government as the object of analogy with the whole concept of representation in general. Us being different with one another—especially in our point of views, ideology, and so on—is obviously enough to be a reason for the variation of one’s preferences and interests in terms of the types of issues, topics and problems that they have presented in their writings. One could pay more attention towards the ‘representation’ of certain value in a text—both literature and non-literature— as that particular value correlates with one’s ideology, point of view, or intentions; thinking that if one writes about that topic, it would be beneficial—or at least entertaining and fulfilling—for him/ her. Things get more complicated, in a way, as one does have the possibility to involve him/herself into a community, in which the member carry a similar understanding upon one idea, thus the act of discussing about representation of one’s idea about certain topic has become a symbiotic connection of fulfilment of the objectives between one’s personal reasons and the missions that the community, in which one got involved, carry. Yet, it is quite ironic to see that the following connection itself, the relation between one’s ideas with his or her community, is a form of representation as the writings, in which one’s idea about his or her interests upon a text is elaborated, have become the representation of not only one’s thoughts but the concept which is discussed in respective communities. The writings ought to present the representation of the idea and interests of both personal interests of the writer—both of which can be considered as the implication of one’s ideological value—and the community which they belong to. Even though such connection will not always be that visible in every single words and sentences of such writing, as the craftsmanship of a writer differs from one another, it would be difficult to perfectly conceal the slightest relevancy showing the correlation of the ideas.

“Specifically, as we will try to show here, a woman writer must examine, assimilate, and transcend the extreme images of “angel” and “monster” which male authors have generated for her” (Gilbert and Gubar in Rivkin and Ryan, 2004: 812).

As an example for the idea of how discourses in representation carry such degree of ideological value, Gilbert and Gubar’s writing, “The Madwoman in the Attic” (1979), is one of the few discourses that presents us with abundant examples regarding ideological values in representation. It is interesting to see how vivid their intention is as they word ‘show’ clearly shows it, taking the role of a bridge between their ideas and every correlating element of the writing. And as soon as we discover ‘a woman writer’, ‘extreme images’ and ‘male authors have generated for her’, being put together in one sentence, we ought to predict that the idea which is being discussed in Gilbert and Gubar’s writing is about the issues on feminism. It is being represented through their presentation on how difficult it was for women to free themselves from the bound—of ‘extreme images’, ideas, description, and many others—which have been established by the works of men. An elaboration of the irony where one of the main hurdles in the struggle of feminism is the idea of how every single method which women can use to determine herself is a product of men, and the opinion of how every single ‘freedom’ which women can achieve will only lead to her own downfall. All of the following issues are the representation that Gilbert and Gubar have presented by analyzing the representation within various works that possess correlating ideas and discussion, like Virginia Woolf’s “Professions for Women,” (1942), John Ruskin’s “Of Queens’ Gardens,” (1899), and many others, in which each respective writers have elaborated their representation of such matter.

Looking towards the high importance of criticism in the society, putting the idea of how the relation between language and its critique are significant, acknowledging the preposition of how the theory of representation is also based by ideological value as it comes in a form discourse as well and being aware to the concept of how all of the following theories—short to speak—is in correlation with the idea of how the process of creating discourses and criticism is based on the sense of skeptically, the sense of finding contradiction, error and irrelevance to investigate something in trying to discover its ‘validities’, it is possible for us to say that the following ideas, concepts and theories are a part of a cycle constructed by skepticality and ideological values. It is a cycle because if we refer back to the sense of curiosity, which humans may carry, its presence and influence upon the way a human mind works is inevitable. Say if we are trying to be critical, or trying to uncover the interesting values, we would use our own sense of curiosity as the basic qualification to find the thing that is relevant to our own perspective, our own ideas. Hence, if we look back again to the idea of high the importance of criticism is in society, as it implies the possibility of a constant production of criticism itself, we could say that a constant sense of both skepticality and critical approaches is also necessary. Yet, if we put such situation into a different perspective, we could also say that the constant presence of criticism—in language, discourse, representation, even literature—is necessary for the existence of language, criticism itself, discourse, discourse about representation, and even literature. We do aware that, as Derrida has pointed out many times before in this writing, the language itself carries the necessity to be criticized. Hence, we are going to be able to correlate this whole condition with the argument that language with all of its accomplices is political. The term ‘political’ that’s being used in this situation is the idea of how one’s action is committed by the reason of presenting one’s power in presenting, or even representing one’s ideas about particular matter. If we are to relate this to the matter of language itself, the continuity on the production of arbitrariness, as one of its attribute in being a ‘language’, is somehow political as it matters for the existence and the presentation of power that language possess. Language is arbitrary because by being one it will influence the society to be critical, to be skeptical against itself, hence the production of critical approach, discourses, and similar form of response, all of which correlate—ironically—to the existence and perseverance that language have. The following idea about the ‘political’ intent and value within language and all of its subordinate is both obviously ideological and based by the existence of ideological elements and value as I’ve elaborated within the preceding paragraphs. As it is so, there are possibilities that you may discover contradiction, error, or deception as it is fairly encouraged if you do catch the point of the whole skeptically ideological yet also political cycle of language that has been pointed out before. Yet, it is indeed inevitable that the language itself may still carry further correlation, relation, and contradiction with another philosophical, or anything that ends with ‘–al’ as the vastness of its arbitrary attributes will always persist.

Work Cited:

Barthes, Roland.1964. “What is Criticism?” retrieved from http://eng5010.pbworks.com/f/Barthes.pdf

Belsey, Catherine.1994. “Constructing the Subject: Deconstructing the Text” in Contemporary Literary Criticism ed. Con Davis, Robert and Schleifer, Ronald. (1994). New York and London: Longman Publishing Group.     

Derrida, Jacques. 1966. “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Critical Theory Since Plato ed. Adams, Hazard and Searle, Leroy. (2004, 3^rd edition; pg. 1206-1215). United States: Wadsworth Publishing.

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